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I. INTRODUCTION
In 2012, Anita Chanko turned on her television to watch "NY Med," a
medical show featuring her city's hospital.1 Rather than seeing other families'
stories, however, she saw footage of her now-deceased husband as a "blurred-
out man moaning in pain." 2 Her husband died in April 2011 at the featured
hospital after being hit by a truck.3 Fists clenched and mouth dry, she watched
his failed treatment and death all over again. 4 Shockingly, "[t]his was the first
time [she] became aware of the recording of [her husband's] medical treatment
and death." 5 While the hospital did not believe it violated the Health Insurance
Portability and Accountability Act's Privacy Rule, federal regulators and a New
York Supreme Court judge disagreed. 6 The hospital will pay $2.2 million in
penalties to the federal government for the violation,7 and because Mrs. Chanko
lives in New York, she can also sue the hospital for breaching physician-patient
confidentiality. 8 None of the $2.2 million penalty, however, will go to Mrs.
Chanko. 9 Her private remedy is separate from the federal settlement payment.
1 Charles Ornstein, Dying in the E. R., and on TV Without His Family's Consent, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 2, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/04/nyregion/dying-in-the-er-and-on-tv-




5 Chanko v. Am. Broad. Cos., 49 N.E.3d 1171, 1174 (N.Y. 2016).6 Ornstein, supra note 1.
7 Charles Ornstein, New York Hospital To Pay $2.2 Million over Unauthorized
Filming of2 Patients, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 21, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/22/ny
region/new-york-hospital-to-pay-fine-over-unauthorized-filming-of-2-paients.html (on file with
Ohio State Law Journal).
8 Chanko, 49 N.E.3d at 1178.
9 See Ornstein, supra note 7.
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The Federal Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996
(HIPAA)1o and its Privacy Rule were intended to improve medical privacy.
Under these rules, covered entities (generally medical providers)" must meet
certain requirements and obtain consent before releasing personally identifiable
health information. 12 These provisions reflect congressional consensus that: 1)
medical privacy is an important right that is crucial for effective medical
treatment, and 2) with the proliferation of electronic records and other means of
communication, the risk for unauthorized disclosure of private medical
information has increased.13
HIPAA violations are not met with damages for victims, but rather with
penalties paid to the federal government.1 4 Without a private right of action,
HIPAA leaves victims without recovery and does not properly incentivize
covered entities to fully comply, as shown by continued HIPAA violations.1 5 In
response to this lack of protection, many states apply a confusing and
contradictory array of state-based legal doctrines for recovery.1 6 These range
from negligence suits against those who violate medical privacy standards,1 7 to
state statutes providing damages,' 8 and many things in between.1 9 The
remaining question, however, is where HIPAA fits within these state-based
legal doctrines. HIPAA contains preemption provisions for laws contrary to its
requirements (excluding more stringent laws),2 0 but which state approaches are
actually contrary to HIPAA is unclear. Lower courts are divided on this
question, meaning HIPAA is interpreted differently among the states.2 1
This Note explores these questions and disparities, and urges a tort-based
solution. In Part H, this Note will discuss HIPAA and its importance. It will also
10 Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191,
§ 1, 110 Stat. 1936 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § § 1320d-1320d-9).
11 As well as others, which will be examined infra Part II.C.
12 See infra Part II.C.
13 See Protecting Our Personal Health Information: Privacy in the Electronic Age:
Hearings on Examining Standards with Respect to the Privacy of Individually Identifiable
Health Information. Views Received from the Secretary, Department of Health and Human
Services, Witnesses Representing Consumers Groups, Health Plans, Health Care Providers,
Health Professionals, and Researchers Before the S Comm. on Labor & Human Res., 105th
Cong. 2-5 (1997) (statements of Sen. Bill Frist, Member, S. Comm. on Labor & Human
Res., and Donna E. Shalala, Secretary, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services).
14 See 45 C.F.R. § 160.424(a) (2016) (noting that penalties are collected by the Health
and Human Services Secretary).
15 See infra Part III.B.
16 See infra Part IV.B.
17 See Byrne v. Avery Ctr. for Obstetrics & Gynecology, P.C., 102 A.3d 32, 36 (Conn.
2014).
18 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 56.35 (West 2007).
19See infra Part IV.B.
2045 C.F.R. § 160.203(b) (2016); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-7(a) (2012).
21 See infra Parts IV.B.2, V.A. For example, in Connecticut, HIPAA informs the
standard of care for negligence, but in Ohio, it does not. See Sheldon v. Kettering Health
Network, 40 N.E.3d 661, 675-76 (Ohio Ct. App. 2015).
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discuss how technological advances and unauthorized disclosures threaten the
crucial right to medical privacy. Part II argues that HIPAA's current
enforcement scheme does not go far enough to protect medical privacy or
provide adequate remedies to victims of HIPAA violations.
Part IV examines state approaches to HIPAA enforcement and whether the
Act's language preempts state causes of action. Part V presents a two-pronged
solution. First, it advocates for an independent tort approach similar to Ohio's
treatment of medical privacy violations, but with suggested modifications.
Second, this Note argues that because Congress has been unwilling to address
HIPAA's preemption and remedy problems and appellate courts have answered
the problem in conflicting ways, a definitive opinion from the Supreme Court is
needed to clarify the strength and reach of HIPAA's enforcement scheme.
Finally, Part VI concludes by linking the importance of medical privacy to the
proposed independent tort approach and need for Supreme Court guidance,
which will help protect sensitive information where others have so far failed.
II. WHAT IS HIPAA AND WHY DOES IT MATTER So MUCH?
Medical privacy is both a historic and modem concept. Long ago,
Hippocrates penned the Hippocratic Oath: "Whatever, in connection with my
professional practice, or not in connection with it, I see or hear in the life of
men, which ought not to be spoken of abroad, I will not divulge, as reckoning
that all such should be kept secret." 22 While some modem physicians think this
should be "radically modified," or "abandoned altogether" because of its
antiquity, 23 the legal controversy surrounding medical privacy today shows this
is an important, changing, and serious issue. Recognizing, in part, the
importance of medical privacy, Congress passed HIPAA in 1996.24
In modern society, where medical information can be shared at the click of
a button and medical records include everything from genetic data to sexual
activity, medical privacy is incredibly important. Congress sought to protect this
information through HIPAA and its implementing regulations and rules, which
specify when information can be shared and the penalties for unauthorized
disclosures. 25
2 2 MARGARET BRAZIER & EMMA CAVE, MEDICINE, PATIENTS AND THE LAW 83 (5th ed.
2011); Peter Tyson, The Hippocratic Oath Today, PBS (Mar. 27, 2001),
http://wwwpbs.org/wgbh/nova/body/hippocratic-oath-today.html [https://permacclDQ7Q-2WF4]
(noting that Hippocrates lived early in the 5th Century, B.C., but also that the oath's origins
are unknown).23 See Tyson, supra note 22.24 See Confidentiality of Patient Records: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Health of
the H. Comm. on Ways & Means, 106th Cong. 2 (2000) [hereinafter Confidentiality
Hearing].
2 5 See id
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A. The Importance ofMedical Privacy
Medical privacy is important for both our healthcare system and for
individuals. First, Congress recognized that without medical privacy, the public
lacks "confidence in our health care system." 26 When patients lack confidence,
they might delay treatment or lie to doctors, which can increase "personal and
financial costs" and result in a "decline in [overall] societal health." 27
Second, medical records "strip us naked" by revealing very sensitive,
personal information, which can negatively impact lives when disclosed.28
"Individually identifiable health information" broadly refers to anything relating
"to the past, present, or future physical or mental health or condition of an
individual," 29 and includes "financial and billing information,... sexually
transmitted diseases, contraception, abortion, substance abuse problems, mental
illness, and medications." 30 Without protections, employers and insurance
companies could abuse medical records to harass or discriminate against
patients.31 Many who have suffered from potential improper disclosures 32
experience "personal embarrassment or harm" and worry that disclosures to
family members, employers, or friends might "negatively impact their job
2 6 1d at 6 (statement of Rep. William M. Thomas, Chairman, Subcomm. on Health, H.
Comm. on Ways & Means); see id (statement of Rep. Jim McDermott, Member, Subcomm.
on Health, H. Comm. on Ways & Means) ("If you do not trust the physician, or the nurse or
whoever the health provider is that this information is going to be kept private, you are liable
to withhold or tell only half the story or whatever.").
27 1d at 10 (statement of Rep. Jim McDermott, Member, Subcomm. on Health, H.
Comm. on Ways & Means).
28 See Ralph Ruebner & Leslie Ann Reis, Hippocrates to HIPAA: A Foundation for a
Federal Physician-Patient Privilege, 77 TEMP. L. REV. 505, 512 (2004) (quoting SIMsON
GARFINKEL, DATABASE NATION: THE DEATH OF PRIVACY IN THE 21ST CENTURY 125
(Deborah Russell ed., 2000)) (discussing medical privacy in the context of a federal
physician-patient privilege). While the Ruebner & Reis article largely focuses on the federal
physician-patient privilege, the information about medical privacy itself is relevant in both
the privilege and more general medical privacy suit contexts. See id Such a privilege would
also protect individuals' medical privacy. See id at 519-20.
2945 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2016) (defining health information under HIPAA).
30 Ruebner & Reis, supra note 28, at 517.
3 1 See id at 527-28.
32 This includes actual disclosures as well as potential disclosures because personal
harm encompasses both actual embarrassment and damage, as well as harm from worrying
that information may have been leaked and the potential effects from that.
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security, relationships, or personal safety." 33 In the face of new technology,
these fears are becoming even more heightened. 34
Today, almost no one is immune from improper personal information
disclosures.3 5 From an Indiana woman's human papillomavirus diagnosis being
spread on Facebook by a local hospital technician 36 to Farrah Fawcett
discovering a hospital employee sold her cancer diagnosis information to
33 Joy L. Pritts, AlteredStates: State Health Privacy Laws and the Impact ofthe Federal
Health Privacy Rule, 2 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y L. & ETHIcs 327, 329 (2002). The risk of
disclosure can also cause isolation and discrimination by employers. Joshua D.W. Collins,
Note, Toothless HIPAA: Searching for a Private Right of Action To Remedy Privacy Rule
Violations, 60 VAND. L. REV. 199, 201 (2007). Prior to the Affordable Care Act's guaranteed
coverage for preexisting conditions, there was also concern that improper disclosures could
lead to insurance denials. See id
34 While electronic health care has increased speed, flexibility, and communication
within medicine, it also creates risks for patients. Sharona Hoffman & Andy Podgurski, In
Sickness, Health, and Cyberspace: Protecting the Security of Electronic Private Health
Information, 48 B.C. L. REV. 331, 332 (2007). Once health "data is dispersed on the Internet,
it becomes available to anyone who is willing to pay for it, and it cannot be expunged." Id
at 335 (footnote omitted). New types of healthcare data are also at risk, like genetic testing,
which reveals a massive amount of sensitive information about individuals. See Ruebner &
Reis, supra note 28, at 520-21; Charles Omstein, Federal Privacy Law Lags Far Behind
Personal-Health Technologies, WASH. POST (Nov. 17, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.
com/news/to-your-health/wp/2015/11/17/federal-privacy-law-lags-far-behind-personal-health-
technologies/ [httpsi//permacc/52FL-ENMH] ("At-home paternity tests fall outside the law's
purview. For that matter, so do wearables like Fitbit that measure steps and sleep, gene
testing companies like 23andMe, and online repositories where individuals can store their
health records."). Furthermore, because doctors are now encouraged by the "movement
toward electronic storage of medical information" to increase the amount of information they
collect from patients, things like lifestyle choices, sexual orientation, and diagnoses are
inside electronic records. Ruebner & Reis, supra note 28, at 521. Hackers can also access
social security numbers, causing huge amounts of "financial and emotional stress" to victims
"wondering if and when [their] information will be used against them." Austin Rutherford,
Comment, Byrne: Closing the Gap Between HIPAA and Patient Privacy, 53 SAN DIEGO L.
REv. 201, 202 (2016) (discussing the hack of health insurer Anthem, where hackers accessed
the social security numbers and other personal information of "over eighty million
peopleO").
3 5 See Charles Ornstein, Your Health Records Are Supposed To Be Private. They
Aren't., WASH. POST (Dec. 30, 2015),
https://www.washingtonposLcom/posteverything/wp/2015/12/30/
your-health-records-are-supposed-to-be-private-they-arent/ [https//perma.cc/P8MV-LPYM].
3 6 Charles Ornstein, Small-Scale Violations of Medical Privacy Often Cause the Most
Harm, PROPUBLICA (Dec. 10, 2015) [hereinafter Ornstein, Small-Scale Violations],
https://www.propublica.org/article/small-scale-violations-of-medical-privacy-often-cause-
the-most-harm [https://perma.cc/TDT7-XF3X]. The victim's full name, diagnosis, and
birthdate were posted on Facebook by the technician, who attended the victim's high school.
Id. The post included statements like "PPL WORLD WIDE, ... FRANCES ... IS HPV
POSITIVE," and "PLZ HELP EXPOSE THIS HOE!" Id.
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tabloids,3 7 medical privacy violations can affect almost anyone.38 Society
recognizes this danger as well. A 2013 study showed that around 60% of
American adults were "very or somewhat concerned about unauthorized
viewing when their medical records are sent electronically between health care
providers." 3 9 While patients recognize the benefits of electronic health records,
they are aware of the very realistic risks. 40
B. HIPAA: The Congressional Solution to Medical Privacy
In light of increasing concerns about medical privacy, in 1996 Congress
took the historic step of enacting HIPAA. 4 1 One of Congress's main purposes
in enacting HIPAA was protecting health information security.42 HIPAA's
Privacy Rule, which "establish[ed] national standards to protect individuals'
medical records and other personal health information," was promulgated in its
final form in 2002.43 In essence, HIPAA restricts how doctors and other entities
can release information, but also creates specific instances where medical
information may be disclosed without patient authorization.44 Prior to HIPAA,
37 Omstein, supra note 35.
38 For more examples of intrusion into and release of sensitive information, see Daniel
J. Oates, Comment, HIPAA Hypocrisy and the Case for Enforcing Federal Privacy
Standards Under State Law, 30 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 745, 745-46 (2007).
3 9 VAISHALI PATEL ET AL., THE OFFICE OF THENAT'L COORDINATOR FOR HEALTH INFO.
TECH., INDIVIDUALS' PERCEPTIONS OF THE PRIVACY AND SECURITY OF MEDICAL RECORDS 3
(June 2015), https-//www.healthitgov/sites/default/files/briefs/oncdatabrief27june2015privacyand
security.pdf [https://permace/KQ4R-D2TE]. These results are largely the same between those
with paper and electronic medical records, although those with electronic records had
"slightly higher rates of withholding information from their provider due to privacy or
security concerns." Id at 2.
40 Id at 5.
4 1 U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., HIPAA for Professionals, HHS.GOV
[hereinafter HHS, HIPAA for Professionals], https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/
[https://perma.cc/TA8W-43X3] (last reviewed June 16, 2017).
4 2 C. STEPHEN REDHEAD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., MEDICAL RECORDS PRIVACY:
QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON THE HIPAA FINAL RULE 2 (Oct. 2002), https://digital.library.unt
edu/ari/6753 1/metacrs225 I/mI//highresd/RS20500_20020ct03.pdf [https://perma.cdYY9J-
Y8JB] (listing reasons included reducing paperwork, lowering administrative causes, and
coordinating health care information and activities). Especially in the face of new
technology, Congress realized new threats "could erode the privacy of health information."
HHS, HIPAA for Professionals, supra note 41. Thus, Congress added standards to protect
"individually identifiable health information" on a federal level. Id
43 U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., The HIPAA Privacy Rule, HHS.GOV,
https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/privacy/ [https://perma.cc/V3B3-GWJ9] (last
reviewed Apr. 16, 2015).
44 REDHEAD, supra note 42, at 2-3. In sum, Congress was responding to growing
concerns about medical privacy when it enacted HIPAA. See id at 2. The protections it
provided were a new and seemingly important expansion of federal law to protect important
rights, but they also generated confusion and criticism. See Luke Gale, HIPAA at 20: Looking
Back at Two Decades of Patient Privacy Protections, HEALTHCARE DIVE (Aug. 30, 2016),
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no federal laws regulated medical privacy.4 5 Thus, "for the first time, a set of
basic national privacy standards and fair information practices ... provide[d] all
Americans with a basic level of protection and peace of mind that is essential to
their full participation in their care." 4 6 HIPAA's actual operation, however, is
governed by the Privacy Rule.47
C. HIPAA in Action: How HIPAA Protects Personal Health
Information48
HIPAA's Privacy Rule prohibits covered entities, 49 such as doctors or
hospitals, from using or disclosing "protected health information" (PHI) without
a "valid authorization." 50 Even with a valid authorization, the law mandates that
disclosures must be consistent with the authorization.5 ' PHI includes
http://www.healthcaredive.com/news/hpaa-at-20-looking-back-at-tw<-iecades-of-patent-prvacy-
protections/425378/ [https//perma.cc/PHP4-DZZT] ("While patients are technically afforded
the right under HIPAA to access their own personal health information, . . . third parties
often have more access to [anonymized] personal health information than patients
themselves.").
45 Daniel J. Solove, HIPAA Turns 10: Analyzing the Past, Present and Future Impact,
AHIMA (Apr. 2013), http://library.ahima.org/doc?oid=106325 [https://perma.cc/SM7N-
6YPP]. Before H[PAA, states were the "primary regulators of health information through
their constitutions, common law, and statutory provisions." Pritts, supra note 33, at 327.4 6 Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 65 Fed. Reg.
82,462, 82,464 (Dec. 28, 2000) (codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 164) [hereinafter Standards
for Privacy].
4 7 Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information, 67 Fed. Reg.
53,182, 53,182 (Aug. 14, 2002) (codified at 45 C.F.R. pts. 160, 164) [hereinafter Standards
2002]. The HIPAA privacy regulations, which define terms and further set out HIPAA rules,
are promulgated by the Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services. See 42
U.S.C. §§ 1320d-1320d-9 (2012).
48 This Note focuses only on the Privacy Rule, not HIPAA's other rules which could
potentially carry their own torts and other implications.
49 Covered entities include health plans, health care clearinghouses, and "health care
provider[s] who transmitf] any health information in electronic form in connection with a
transaction covered" by the federal regulations implementing HIPAA. 45 C.F.R.
§ 160.102(a)(1)-(3) (2016). Covered entities can also include "business associates." Id.
§ 160.102(b). In general, these are "person[s] or entit[ies] that perform certain functions or
activities that involve the use or disclosure of protected health information on behalf of, or
provide[] services to, a covered entity," but not including a "covered entity's workforce."
U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Business Associates, HHS.Gov, https-//www.hhs.gov/
hipaa/for-pmfessionals/privacy/guidance/business-associatestindex.html [https//permacc/NG9P-
WA8C] (last reviewed July 26, 2013); see also 45 C.F.R. § 160.103. The Privacy Rule
standards "apply to covered entities with respect to protected health information." 45 C.F.R.
§ 164.500(a) (2015).
50 45 C.F.R. § 164.502(aXlXiv) (2015).
511d § 164.508(a). A "valid authorization under this section must contain at least" 1) a
"specific and meaningful" description of what information is being used/disclosed, 2) "[t]he
name or other specific identification of the person(s) ... authorized to make the requested
use or disclosure," 3) the names or identities of the person(s) "to whom the covered entity
418 [Vol. 79:2
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individually identifiable health information 52 that is "(i) [t]ransmitted by
electronic media; (ii) [m]aintained in electronic media; or (iii) [t]ransmitted or
maintained in any other form or medium." 53 For example, PHI can include both
information in individuals' medical charts 54 and their genetic information.55 The
Privacy Rule lays out specific allowed uses and disclosures for PHI. 56 For
example, a covered entity can disclose PHI to the individual it is about when the
individual requests it,57 or "for treatment, payment, or [other] health care
operations." 58 Covered entities may also disclose information about reasonably
suspected abuse or domestic violence to government authorities, such as
protective service agencies. 59 While on its face complex and comprehensive,
HIPAA has not adequately protected patient privacy due to lax and inconsistent
enforcement.
III. HIPAA INACTION: How IT Is ENFORCED AND WHY THIS Is NOT
ENOUGH
While HIPAA's Privacy Rule strives to protect privacy rights, lax
enforcement has led to serious concerns about the rule's strength, stringency,
and effectiveness. 60 As enforcement agencies continue to favor voluntary
compliance over penalties and sanctions,6 1 victims of medical privacy violations
may make the requested use or disclosure," 4) "[a] description of each purpose of the
requested use or disclosure," 5) the expiration date or event on which the
disclosure/authorization ends, and 6) the individual's signature and the date. Id
§ 164.508(c)(i)-(vi).
52 The regulations define "individually identifiable health information" as "information
that is a subset of health information, including demographic information collected from an
individual" that is "created or received by a health care provider, health plan, employer, or
health care clearinghouse" that also "[r]elates to the past, present, or future physical or mental
health or condition of an individual; the provision of health care to an individual; or the past,
present, or future payment for the provision of health care to an individual" and either
"identifies the individual" or creates "a reasonable basis to believe the information can be
used to identify the individual." 45 C.F.R. § 160.103 (2016).
53 Id
54 U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Your Rights Under HIPAA, HHS.GOv
[hereinafter HHS, Your Rights Under HIPAA], https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-individuals/
guidance-materials-for-consumers/index.html [https://perma.cc/TNX3-CZGV] (last reviewed
Feb. 1, 2017).
55 U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Does the HIPAA Privacy Rule Protect Genetic
Information?, HHS.Gov (Dec. 20, 2002), https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/faq/354/
does-hipaa-protect-genetic-information/index.html [https//permacc/1HLU4-LWU9].
56 See 45 C.F.R. §§ 164.502-164.526 (2015).
57I[d § 164.502(a)(1)(i), (a)(2)(i).
581d § 164.506(a).
59 1d § 164.512(c)(1).
6 0 See infra Part III.B.61 See infra notes 65-67 and accompanying text.
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are left without personal remedies for their often stigmatizing and personally
devastating harms.
A. HIPAA Enforcement Procedures
If an individual's medical privacy rights are violated under the Privacy Rule,
that person cannot directly sue the guilty party.62 Instead, victims must file their
complaints with the Health and Human Services (HHS) Secretary through the
Office for Civil Rights (OCR), 63 or seek relief through their state attorney
general.64 The OCR can investigate complaints, "conduct compliance reviews,"
and "perform[] education and outreach to foster compliance" with the Privacy
Rule. 65 After an investigation, the OCR must decide whether the complaint
should be sent to the Department of Justice (DOJ) for criminal investigations.6
If the OCR determines that the covered entity violated HIPAA's Privacy Rule,
it can try to solve the issue "by obtaining[] [v]oluntary compliance[,]
[c]orrective action[,] and/or [r]esolution agreement[s]. "67
62 Jack Brill, Note, Giving HIPAA Enforcement Room To Grow: Why There Should Not
(Yet) Be a Private Cause ofAction, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 2105, 2106 (2008); see, e.g.,
Sneed v. Pan Am. Hosp., 370 F. App'x 47, 50 (11th Cir. 2010) (per curiam) ("We decline to
hold that HIPAA creates a private cause of action . . . ."); Adams v. Eureka Fire Prot. Dist.,
352 F. App'x 137, 139 (8th Cir. 2009) (per curiam) ("HIPAA does not create a private
right .. ).
6 3 See 45 C.F.R. § 160.306(a) (2016); see also U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs.,
What OCR Considers During Intake & Review, HHS.Gov, https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-
professionals/compliance-enforcement/examples/what-OCR-considers-during-intake-and-
review/index.html [https://perma.cc/5APR-W5TF] (last reviewed June 7, 2017). While the
OCR is involved in many areas of government services, in the HIPAA/medical privacy
context, its mission is to "protect[] [individuals'] fundamental nondiscrimination and health
information privacy rights." U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Office for Civil Rights,
About Us, HHS.Gov, https://www.hhs.gov/ocr/about-us/index.html [https://perma.cc/BE4Q-
WUER] (last reviewed Sept. 6, 2015).
642 U.S.C. § 1320d-5(d)(1)-(2) (2012).65 U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., How OCR Enforces the HIPAA Privacy &
Security Rules, HHS.Gov [hereinafter HHS, How OCR Enforces], https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/
for-professionals/compliance-enforcement/examples/how-OCR-enforces-the-HIAA-privacy-
and-security-rules/index.html [https://perma.cclZ9A6-9XXV] (last reviewed June 7, 2017).6 6 Id
67 Id These are the most common enforcement methods. Id One example of voluntary
compliance measures, instead of compulsory punishments, revolves around the improper
disclosure of Peter Brabeck's information in California. See Ornstein, Small-Scale
Violations, supra note 36. Peter's doctor allegedly overprescribed Peter controlled
substances without an examination, resulting in a medical board investigation of the doctor.
Id The doctor hired a private investigator to investigate Peter, and gave him access to "all
of [Peter's] medical records." Id. After the doctor refused to pay him, the investigator offered
to sell the records to Peter, who then complained to OCR. Id After two years, the OCR
claimed the complaint was resolved because the clinic was given "guidance on how to
comply with privacy rules" and the doctor agreed to apologize, acknowledge his improper
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Unauthorized disclosures of individually identifiable health information can
also result in penalties and potential jail sentences.68 However, monetary
penalties go to the U.S. Treasury rather than to the victims. 69 In sum, while there
are processes for filing complaints, "a patient who has been seriously harmed as
a result of .. . privacy leaks cannot bring a lawsuit against the responsible party"
or recover individually, and instead must rely on a goverment penalty and
enforcement process. 70
B. HIPAA's Enforcement Procedures Alone Do Not Adequately Protect
Patient Privacy
As many have noted, HHS rarely imposes fines/sanctions, and victims are
not compensated for the harm caused by improper disclosures.7 1 Recently, OCR
Director Jocelyn Samuels noted that the agency's "preference is always to
promote voluntary compliance." 72 Since HIPAA lacks a private right of action,
for the patients harmed in these cases, the OCR/HHS is often "the only place
they can seek vindication." 73 As such, in 2015, HHS received 17,643
complaints, 74 but 72% were resolved after intake and review and only 4%
disclosure, and give Peter free credit monitoring. Id Peter stated he has not received any of
these. Id. There were no monetary or other penalties. See id
6842 U.S.C. § 1320d-6(a)-(b).
69 See 45 C.F.R. § 160.424(a) (2016); see also HHS, How OCR Enforces, supra note
65.
70 Collins, supra note 33, at 201-02.
711d. at 202; see also Oates, supra note 38, at 750-52. In 2015, after studying breaches
of protected health information, the Office of the Inspector General recommended "OCR
should strengthen its followup of breaches of PHI reported by covered entities." SUZANNE
MURRIN, DEP'T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GEN., OCR SHOULD
STRENGTHEN ITS FOLLOWUP OF BREACHES OF PATIENT HEALTH INFORMATION REPORTED BY
COVERED ENTITIES 13 (Sept. 2015), https://oig.hhs.gov/oei/reports/oei-09-10-0051 1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/A4QP-8CEC].
72 Omstein, Small-Scale Violations, supra note 36. There are relatively few criminal
HIPAA prosecutions in the United States. For example, a case out of Anchorage, Alaska in
2015 was one of the first in the state and "one of the few in the country." Press Release, U.S.
Dep't of Justice, Anchorage Woman Sentenced to Two Years Imprisonment for HIPAA
Violation (June 1, 2015), https//wwwjustice.gov/usao-ak/pr/anchorage-woman-sentenced-two-
years-imprisonment-hipaa-violation [https/permacclH5F7-MD5E]. There, Stacy Laulu was
convicted of two felony HIPAA violations and sentenced to two years in jail after using her
access to a hospital's medical records to inform her codefendant about his sexual assault and
gunshot victims' medical records and other confidential information. Id In sentencing, the
judge noted, "in this day and age, every human being expects private records to remain
private." Id
73 Ornstein, Small-Scale Violations, supra note 36.
74 U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Health Information Privacy Complaints
Received by Calendar Year, HHS.Gov, https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/compliance
-enforcement/data/complaints-received-by-calendar-year/index.html [https://perma.cc/E2HF-
QKG8] (last reviewed Oct. 13, 2016).
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actually received some type of corrective action.75 However, even that 4% did
not result in victim compensation.
As a result, it is easy to see why HIPAA enforcement is not enough for
medical privacy victims. Victims are often left with severe emotional trauma or
embarrassment, 76 while covered entities need only, for example,
"reposition ... computer monitors to prevent patients from viewing information
on the screens," and apologize to patients. 77 Because of this, many states have
struck out on their own to find medical privacy solutions to protect their citizens.
IV. DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO ENFORCING MEDICAL PRIVACY: STATE
SOLUTIONS PLUS PREEMPTION AND OTHER PROBLEMS
States have created their own solutions for medical privacy violations, each
with its own benefits and downfalls.7 8 In assessing each approach, courts
generally must decide if the law/action is preempted by HIPAA.79 Divergent
state court interpretations of the same federal statute lead to a clear problem: An
individual's medical privacy rights vary between the states.80 To fix that
problem, it is important to first understand preemption in the HIPAA context.
A. General Statutory HIPAA Preemption8 1
The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution guarantees that
federal laws are the "supreme Law of the Land." 82 This means when federal and
state laws conflict, federal law preempts or generally controls. 83
75 U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., Enforcement Results by Year, HHS.Gov,
https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/compliance-enforcement/datalenforcement-
results-by-year/index.html [https://perma.cc/UGM8-EQAH] (last reviewed Oct. 13, 2016).
76 See, e.g., Ornstein, Small-Scale Violations, supra note 36.
77 See U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., All Case Examples, HHS.GOv [hereinafter
HHS, All Case Examples], https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/compliance-
enforcement/examples/all-cases/index.html#casel2 [https://perma.cc/M8MT-U3HF] (last
reviewed June 7, 2017).
78 See infra Part IV.B.
79 See, e.g., Murphy v. Dulay, 768 F.3d 1360, 1367-68 (11th Cir. 2014) (performing a
preemption analysis on a Florida statute requiring patients attempting to bring medical
negligence claims to authorize the release of their protected health information); O'Donnell
v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Wyo., 173 F. Supp. 2d 1176, 1183-84 (D. Wyo. 2001)
(deciding whether HIPAA completely preempts state law claims).8 0 See infra Part IV.B.
81 This Subpart discusses only HIPAA's statutory preemption clause. The preemption
problem surrounding HIPAA-based torts, which is the focus of this Note, is more clearly
spelled out in Part. IV.B.2.c.i.8 2 U.S. CONST. art. VI.8 3 See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND PouCIES 412
(5th ed. 2015). The Supreme Court has recognized three types of federal preemption. Id. at
413. First, there is explicit preemption, which occurs when Congress includes explicitly
preemptive language. Gade v. Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992)
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HIPAA has its own conflict preemption clause, stating that HIPAA
generally "supersede[s] any contrary provision of State law." 84 A state law is
contrary to HIPAA's Privacy Rule when "[a] covered entity or business
associate would find it impossible to comply with both the State and Federal
requirements; or [when] [t]he provision of State law stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution" of the Rule's purposes and objectives.85
However, if the "State law relates to the privacy of individually identifiable
health information and is more stringent than" the Privacy Rule, then there is no
preemption. 86
Laws are "more stringent" than the Privacy Rule when they prevent a use
or disclosure the Privacy Rule would normally allow.87 They are also more
stringent if they "narrow the scope or duration, increase the privacy protections
afforded . . ., or reduce the coercive effect of the circumstances surrounding the
express legal permission" of "the form, substance, or . .. need for express legal
permission from an individuall who is the subject of the individually
identifiable health information," or "provide[] greater privacy protection for the
individual who is the subject of the individually identifiable health information"
(O'Connor, J.). Second, field preemption occurs when "the scheme of federal regulation is
'so pervasive as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for the States
to supplement it."' Id (quoting Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)).
Third, conflict preemption occurs when it is physically impossible to comply with both the
state and federal rules/regulations, id (citing Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul,
373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963)), or "where state law 'stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress,"' id (quoting
Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131, 138 (1988); Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637, 649 (1971);
Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52,67 (1941)).
8442 U.S.C. § 1320d-7(a)(1) (2012). This includes "a provision of State law that
requires medical or health plan records (including billing information) to be maintained or
transmitted in written rather than electronic form." Id State laws include state
"constitution[s], statute[s], regulations[s], rule[s], common law, or other State action[s]
having the force and effect of law." 45 C.F.R. § 160.202 (2016).
85 45 C.F.R. § 160.202.
86 1d. § 160.203(b); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-7(a)(2)(B). A law "[rJelates to the
privacy of individually identifiable health information" when it specifically protects "health
information or affects the privacy of health information in a direct, clear, and substantial
way." 45 C.F.R. § 160.202. Also, HIPAA does not supersede contrary provisions that the
HHS Secretary determines are necessary for purposes including to "prevent fraud and
abuse," to help states regulate "insurance and health plans," to enable "State reporting on
health care delivery costs," or that "address[] controlled substances." 42 U.S.C.
§ 1320d-7(a)(2)(A)(i)-(ii). Contrary state law provisions are also not preempted if they relate
to disease, "injury, child abuse, birth, or death" reporting, "or for the conduct of public health
surveillance, investigation, or intervention." 45 C.F.R. § 160.203(c). State laws requiring "a
health plan to report, or to provide access to, information for the purpose of management
audits, financial audits, program monitoring and evaluation, or the licensure or certification
of facilities or individuals" are not preempted when contrary to HIPAA as well. Id.
§ 160.203(d).
8745 C.F.R. § 160.202.
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regarding all other matters.8 8 Thus, HIPAA creates the "federal 'floor' of
minimum privacy protections," 89 and the question courts face regarding medical
privacy is whether the state approach is preempted by HIPAA by falling short
of the federal floor.90
Id; see also U.S. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., How Do I Know if a State Law
Is "More Stringent" than the HIPAA Privacy Rule?, HHS.Gov (Mar. 12, 2003) [hereinafter
HHS, More Stringent], https://www.hhs.gov/hipaa/for-professionals/faq/403/how-do-i-know-if-
a-state-law-is-more-stringent-than-hipaa/index.html [https://perma.cc/2ZZ6-64GH] ("For
example, a State law that provides individuals with a right to inspect and obtain a copy of
their medical records in a more timely manner than the Privacy Rule is 'more stringent' than
the Privacy Rule."). When the state law is more stringent than the Privacy Rule, but also
contrary to it, the more stringent "State law prevails." Id. When the Privacy Rule and more
stringent state rule "are not contrary, covered entities must comply with both." Id The
regulation contains other conditions marking laws as "more stringent" as well, which are less
relevant to this discussion. See 45 C.F.R. § 160.202.
89 REDHEAD, supra note 42, at 6. In a hearing about the proposed Privacy Rule, the
Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation in HHS noted that HIPAA's confidentiality
rules are "cumulative" along with state laws, meaning that HIPAA provides "every
American with a basic set of rights with respect to health information." Confidentiality
Hearing, supra note 24, at 18 (statement of Margaret A. Hamburg, Assistant Secretary for
Planning and Evaluation, U.S. Department of Health and Human Services). HHS has said
that the Congressional goal behind the explicit preemption regulations was "to let the law
that is most protective of privacy control (the 'federal floor approach' . .. )." Standards for
Privacy, supra note 46, at 82,580. However, HHS rejected using the term "most protective
of the individual's privacy" in favor of "more stringent" because "more stringent" provided
more guidance. Id. at 82,582.
9 0 See HIPAA Regulations: Preemption of State Law: Definitions: Contrary -§ 160.202, BRICKER & ECKLER [hereinafter Preemption of State Law],
http://www.bricker.com/industries-practices/hipaa-health-information-technology/insights-
resources/resource/hipaa-regulations-preemption-of-state-law-defiitions-contrary-%C2%
A7-160202-274 [https://perma.CC/W4UD-SZ7M] ("Since preemption is a judicially
developed doctrine, it is reasonable to interpret this term as indicating that the statutory
analysis should tie in to the analytical formulations employed by the courts. Also, while the
court-developed tests may not be as clear as commenters would like, they represent a long-
term, thoughtful consideration of the problem of defining when a state/federal conflict exists.
They will also, we assume, generally be employed by the courts when conflict issues arise
under the rules . . . .").
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B. Varied State Solutions: The HIPAA-Pota-Mess91
Prior to HIPAA, states were "the primary regulators of health
information." 92 When the Privacy Rule was promulgated, HHS noted that
"[s]tate laws [were] a crucial means of protecting health information," but they
varied "dramatically." 93 Especially regarding "consent for use and disclosure,"
the existing laws failed to meet public expectations.94
Because HIPAA has also failed to meet expectations about protecting
privacy due to lax enforcement and standards, states have continued to make,
keep, and update their own privacy rules.95 However, these rules and
individuals' medical privacy rights remain varied across state lines. 96 While
HIPAA was intended to set national standards and make up for increasingly
varied state privacy laws, its lack of enforcement seems to have had the opposite
effect.97
1. State Statutes About Medical Privacy
Some states have created their own statutes addressing medical privacy,
which helps patients and providers by setting clear expectations and limits on
what can and cannot be done.98 For example, if a California medical provider
improperly discloses medical information without authorization and it is
accompanied by either economic loss or personal injury, the victim can recover
compensatory damages, punitive damages, attorney's fees, and other litigation
costs.99However, these state-specific remedies, penalties, punishments, and
9 1 Prior to HIPAA, "virtually every state ha[d] enacted one or more laws to safeguard
privacy." Standards for Privacy, supra note 46, at 82,463. Analyzing each possible approach
is beyond this Note's scope. Instead, this Note focuses on the dominant approaches and those
addressed by the most recent litigation. This Note also focuses on tort-based approaches, as
many others have already suggested or analyzed state law and other statutory solutions. See,
e.g., Pritts, supra note 33, at 327-28 (discussing state statutory solutions); Collins, supra
note 33, at 208-24 (discussing both 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suits and the False Claims Act).
92 See Pritts, supra note 33, at 330.
93 Standards for Privacy, supra note 46, at 82,472.
94 See id at 82,473.
9 5 See supra Part Ill.B; infra Part IV.B.2.
9 6 See Oates, supra note 38, at 763.
97 See Standards for Privacy, supra note 46, at 82,463-64.
98 As the Congressional Research Service notes, some states have "detailed, stringent
standards governing the use and disclosure of health information," and privacy protections
that are stronger than those provided by HIPAA are not preempted. REDHEAD, supra note
42, at 6; see also Pritts, supra note 33, at 335.
99 See CAL. CIV. CODE § 56.35 (West 2007). Texas also has strong privacy protections
for its citizens. See Peg D. Hall & Matt Nickel, New Medical Privacy Law in Texas: What
You Need To Know, DALL. B. Ass'N (July 24, 2015), http//www.dallasbar.org/book-page/new-
medical-privacy-law-texas-what-you-need-know [https-/permaceffHC6-UXMC] ("Concerned
that HIPAA and HITECH did not provide enough safeguards for protected health
information (PHI), the Texas legislature passed H.B. 300 in 2011."). While the statute
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sanctions vary across the country and can govern anything from public health
to privileged communications, and some even set out provider-specific rules.10 0
Some medical law scholars recommend that since "[s]tates have
traditionally been the primary regulators of health care information," in a post-
HIPAA world they should continue to be active and enact "statutes that either
mirror or build upon the federal protections."' 0 ' Protections going above and
beyond HIPAA are likely not preempted; thus, states could continue to create
their own rules.1 02
While this seems like a good approach because states could craft rules to
avoid HIPAA preemption, this method also has problems. First, as previously
noted, these types of statutes and regulations vary greatly.1 03 Congress, courts,
and individuals have recognized the importance of medical privacy, and having
such varied protections is at odds with that. 104 Healthcare providers operating
across state lines or patients moving between states will face difficulties
adjusting to differing laws, which diminishes uniformity and places value on
some protections over others. 0 5
As for the preemption analysis, this approach burdens healthcare providers
who must "identify[] all state law provisions that affect [their] privacy policies
and practices, decide which of those provisions specifically 'relate to' the
privacy of individually identifiable health information, and then determine
explicitly adopts HIPAA provisions, TEx. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. § 181.004(a)
(Vernon 2010 & Supp. 2015), it also provides some more expansive protections, Hall &
Nickel, supra. For example, Texas's definition of "covered entities" is more expansive than
HIPAA's because it includes all "business associate[s], health care payer[s], governmental
unit[s], information or computer management entit[ies], school[s], health researcher[s],
health care facilit[ies], clinic[s], health care provider[s], or person[s] who maintain[] an
Internet site" and who assemble, collect, analyze, use, evaluate, store, or transmit protected
health information "for commercial, financial, or professional gain, monetary fees, or dues,
or on a cooperative, nonprofit, or pro bono basis." TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN.
§ 181.001(b)(2)(A). It also covers those who "come[l into possession of protected health
information[,] .. . obtain[] or storeO protected health information," or are "employee[s],
agent[s], or contractor[s]" of the previously listed entities "insofar as the employee, agent,
or contractor creates, receives, obtains, maintains, uses, or transmits protected health
information." Id. § 181.001(b)(2)(B)-(D). For more information on the Texas statute, see
Hall & Nickel, supra.
1 00 Pritts, supra note 33, at 335-36, 338. "The result of this ad hoc approach is that in
many states, there is no statutory guidance as to the proper use and disclosure of health
information with respect to many of the major providers of health care." Id. at 336.
101 Id. at 347.1 0 2 See id
1 03 See Grace Ko, Note, Partial Preemption Under the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act, 79 S. CAL. L. REv. 497, 505-06 (2006).
104 See supra Parts III.A-B.
10 5 See Ko, supra note 103, at 506 ("Because covered entities must respect the laws of
the states in which they do business, they have been grappling with this patchwork regulatory
system since long before HIPAA's enactment.").
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whether they are 'contrary' to the corresponding federal standard and, if so,
whether they are 'more stringent."'l 06
Thus, while this approach might allow states to enhance HIPAA protections,
or fill in their gaps, it is not perfect. Without uniformity, these varied laws are
very burdensome to both health care providers and patients.
2. Torts
Many writers have suggested using torts to enforce medical privacy.' 0 7 One
reason is that torts "allow plaintiffs who have been legitimately harmed by
unauthorized medical records disclosure[s] to recover for their injur[ies]," while
preventing frivolous and fake claims. 108 Torts were also the general way
medical privacy was enforced pre-HIPAA.1 09 Lastly, the threat from tort
damages makes covered entities more likely to follow medical privacy standards
because they understand "failure to do so may result in a multitude of large
damages awards that are not subject to the HIPAA statutory cap."o10 However,
like statutory approaches, tort-based approaches vary wildly in both their
required elements and theories, and face their own preemption problems.11 1
a. The Restatement-Based Privacy Torts
The Second Restatement of Torts recognizes four types of privacy right
violations: 1) "unreasonable intrusion upon the seclusion of another," 2)
"appropriation of the other's name or likeness," 3) "unreasonable publicity
given to the other's private life," and 4) "publicity that unreasonably places the
other in a false light before the public."l " 2 In states using the Restatement torts,
victims of medical privacy violations can usually sue only for an unreasonable
1061d at 505 ("State law provisions that are more stringent will survive and reverse
preempt the federal law, while those that are less stringent will be preempted."). For a fuller
discussion of the complex processes covered entities must comply with when crossing state
lines, see id at 505-12.
107 See, e.g., Collins, supra note 33, at 224-32; Michael Frankel, Note, Do Doctors Have
a Constitutional Right To Violate Their Patients' Privacy?: Ohio's Physician Disclosure
Tort and the First Amendment, 46 VILL. L. REv. 141, 143 (2001); Rutherford, supra note 34,
at 214 ("The threat of damages in tort suits should improve compliance by the various entities
subject to HIPAA regulation.").
108 Collins, supra note 33, at 225. A tort-based solution could allow patients suffering
actual harm to recover, but not allow "opportunistic plaintiffs to enforce regulations that
should be left to the HHS Secretary's discretion." Id (noting this would help prevent
"frivolous litigation").
109 See id.
110 Rutherford, supra note 34, at 214.
111See infra Part IV.B.2.a.
I12 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A(I H2) (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
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intrusion upon seclusion or unreasonable publicity given to another's private
life. 113
Oklahoma has adopted the Restatement approach.11 4 In a 2006 case, the
Western District of Oklahoma looked at both "intrusion upon the seclusion of
another and unreasonable publicity given to the other's private life."115 In Doe
v. Brundage-Bone Concrete Pumping Inc., the plaintiff, a construction
employee, received medical treatment and temporary disability due to
injuries.11 6 While on disability, his employer erroneously received a health
insurance form from a hospital visit unrelated to the plaintiffs worker's
compensation claim.1 17 The hospital then showed the employer "several pages
of billing records," containing two pages "clearly includ[ing] references to
treatment for a back injury" and a reference to a "CT CHEST W/O STAT" test,
which he took back to his office.118 The hospital disclosed the records believing
he was "authorized to obtain" them because he "provided the necessary personal
information to gain access."1 1 9 While the employer actually did not have a
release from the plaintiff, the plaintiffs 2003 hospital release indicated his
records could be disclosed to parties necessary for workers' compensation
claims.1 20
A few months later, the plaintiff attempted to get his job back, and while
jobs were available, he was not offered one.121 His employer claimed this was
"because Plaintiff had previously indicated that he did not like the physically
demanding work" or operating a certain machine.1 22 However, the plaintiff
alleged that the billing records contained his HIV treatment records.1 23 He sued
the hospital for medical privacy violations, claiming the disclosure cost him his
job.1 24
First, the court rejected the "unreasonable publicity" claim, which requires
unreasonable publicity given to a private fact, because disclosing the
113 See, e.g., Doe v. Brundage-Bone Concrete Pumping, Inc., No. CIV-05-1287-C, 2006





1181d at *2. Another employee also saw these records on the employer's desk. Id
11 9 Brundage-Bone, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100042, at *3. The hospital's first answer
claimed the employer "identified himself as Plaintiff and requested copies of billing




1231d. at *4-5 ("[But] Van Nest and other employees .. . claim that they did not know
that Plaintiff was HIV+ until [the] lawsuit was filed."). Plaintiff, therefore, brought suit on




information to a small number of coworkers was not publication.1 25 Next, the
court rejected the intrusion upon seclusion claim, which requires
"nonconsensual intrusion" that is "highly offensive to a reasonable person."l 26
Both the intrusion itself and the hospital employee's conduct in giving out the
record to the employer, whom he believed was the plaintiff despite no
affirmative misrepresentation of identity, were not highly offensive to a
reasonable person. 127
b. The Cons of a Restatement Approach Outweigh the Benefits
Brundage-Bone highlights the benefits and problems of applying traditional
privacy tort theories to medical privacy violations. First, both tort theories
beneficially eliminate the confidentiality problem in other tort theories like
negligence and confidentiality breach. Using these torts can "eliminate the need
for a confidential relationship and rely solely on the disclosure of confidential
information."1 28 As for the intrusion upon seclusion claim, it has the benefit of
not requiring publication.1 29 This is useful in medical privacy cases where the
information was not disclosed to the general public, but "the disclosure itself
[was] nonetheless extremely injurious."' 30 However, there are problems here as
well.
Even unintentional privacy violations that aren't highly offensive to most
people can cause serious harms. A doctor leaving out a patient file or a
government agency improperly disclosing private information may not be
intentional, but the harms felt by victims are still real. Furthermore, the risk of
suit for unintentional violations will deter future abuses and make actors more
careful than they otherwise might be. For many of these same reasons, the
"highly offensive" requirement might not always be satisfied in medical privacy
cases. While many consider their medical information very sensitive and, as
individual victims, would find an improper disclosure highly offensive,1 3 1 it is
125 Brundage-Bone, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 100042, at *10 (granting summary judgment
for employer on the unreasonable publicity claim).
1261d at *11 (granting summary judgment for employer on the intrusion-upon-seclusion
claim).
127 1d at *11-12. The employer was wearing a shirt with his own name on it. Id. The
court also noted the "issue of fact as to why [the employer] wanted those records and what
he hoped to learn," but the evidence was still not strong enough to show highly offensive
conduct. Id. at * 12. The court, however, declined to base summary judgment on consensual
intrusion because the employer may have acted "beyond the scope of the limited consent"
provided by the 2003 release "in violation of Plaintiffs reasonable expectation of privacy."
Id. at *12 n.4.
12 8 See Oates, supra note 38, at 768.
12 9 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B cmt. b (AM. LAW INST. 1977).
13 0 See Oates, supra note 38, at 764.
131 Id at 771; see also LYGEIA RICCIARDI, CONSUMER PARTNERSHIP FOR EHEALTH,
PROTECTING SENSITIVE HEALTH INFORMATION IN THE CONTEXT OF HEALTH INFORMATION
TECHNOLOGY 2 (June 2010), http://www.nationalpartnership.org/research-library/health-
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possible a reasonable person would not find it offensive. 132 Imposing the
reasonable person standard on something as important, complex, and contoured
as medical privacy ignores the severe harm individuals can feel from privacy
violations.
The "publicity given to private life" tort faces similar problems, as shown
in Brundage-Bone where the plaintiff was denied recovery because the exposure
of his medical records, including the potential release of his HIV+ status, to a
group of coworkers was not publication. 133 The ruling did not speak to the
underlying personhood and privacy harm, but rather to the number of people the
information was disclosed to, thus leaving the plaintiff without remedy.1 34 The
Restatement clarifies that "publicity" "means that the matter is made public, by
communicating it to the public at large, or to so many persons that the matter
must be regarded as substantially certain to become one of public
knowledge." 35 This is unlikely in many medical privacy cases, so victims who
experience painful and embarrassing disclosures only to small groups are left
without remedy.1 36
In sum, while the general Restatement torts have definite benefits for
individuals seeking to recover in medical privacy suits, their limits prevent them
from adequately protecting victims of medical privacy violations. Outside of
these traditional torts, some states also go further and incorporate HIPAA
standards into their tort-remedy frameworks.
c. HIPAA -Influenced Torts
Many states also recognize traditional tort claims, such as negligence or
breach of confidentiality, in the realm of medical privacy.1 37 However, the new
trend seems to be towards allowing HIPAA to influence these traditional
torts. 138 Essentially, some courts have found that "to the extent it has become
the common practice for [state] health care providers to follow the procedures
required under HIPAA in rendering services to their patients, HIPAA and its
care/HIT/protecting-sensitive-health.pdf [https://perma.ccIY34F-VBNK]. With sensitive
medical information relating to things like domestic violence, abortion, substance abuse,
STDs, etc., patients risk possible "discrimination, social stigma, and physical harm." Id. at
2-3. This information can sometimes extend beyond risks to the individual patient, and also
affect families and employers. See id. at 2.
132 See Collins, supra note 33, at 226.
1 33 See Doe v. Brundage-Bone Concrete Pumping, Inc., No. CIV-05-1287-C, 2006 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 100042, at *10 (W.D. Okla. Aug. 23, 2006).
1341d, at *22.
135 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. a (AM. LAW IN ST. 1977).
136 Collins, supra note 33, at 226-27; Oates, supra note 38, at 764.
137 See, e.g, Byrne v. Avery Ctr. for Obstetrics & Gynecology, P.C., 102 A.3d 32, 36
(Conn. 2014); R.K. v. St. Mary's Med. Ctr., Inc., 735 S.E.2d 715, 723-24 (W. Va. 2012).
138 See Byrne, 102 A.3d at 42.
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implementing regulations may be utilized to inform the standard of care
applicable to such claims arising from allegations of negligence." 3 9
One of the most recent and well-publicizedl 4 0 cases comes from the
Connecticut Supreme Court. 14 1 The plaintiff in Byrne v. Avery Center for
Obstetrics & Gynecology, Emily, sued her obstetrics and gynecology (OBGYN)
office after it released her private medical information, without her
authorization, in response to a subpoena. 142 Emily specifically instructed the
OBGYN not to release her information to Mendoza, her ex-boyfriend and father
of her child, in 2004, but a Connecticut court subpoenaed the records after
Mendoza filed a paternity suit against Emily in 2005.143 Without ever notifying
Emily about the subpoena or attempting to quash it, the OBGYN mailed her file
to the court where Mendoza viewed it in the court file.144 Emily was later able
to seal her medical file, but claimed Mendoza harassed and threatened her after
he initially viewed the records. 145
Emily sued the OBGYN, alleging it "acted negligently by failing to use
proper and reasonable care in protecting her medical file, including disclosing
it without authorization in violation of [state laws] and the department's
regulations implementing HIPAA."l 46 The lower court found that all actions
dealing with private medical information were preempted by HIPAA, and that
because "HIPAA does not create a private right of action, . . . claims of
violations instead [must] be raised through the department's administrative
channels."1 4 7 The lower court believed the plaintiff's negligence claims were
actually just relabeled HIPAA claims. 14 8 In response, Emily said her claims
were not HIPAA private action claims, but were instead for common-law
negligence "with HIPAA informing the standard of care."l 49
139Id. at 49. Some courts have allowed plaintiffs to use HIPAA violations as a basis for
state negligence per se claims. See, e.g., Harmon v. Maury Cty., No. 1:05-0026, 2005 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 48094, at *8-11 (M.D. Tenn. Aug. 31, 2005); St. Mary's Med Cir., 735 S.E.2d
at 723.
140 See, e.g., Allison Grande, HIPAA Doesn't Preempt Negligence Claims: Conn. High
Court, LAW360 (Nov. 6, 2014), https://www.law360.com/articles/594162/hipaa-doesn-t-
preempt-negligence-claims-conn-high-court (on file with Ohio State Law Journal); Joseph
J. Lazzarotti, Negligence Claims for Breach of Patient Privacy Not Preempted by HIPAA,
Connecticut Supreme Court Holds, NAT'L L. REv. (Nov. 10, 2014), http://www.natlawreview.
com/arice/negligence-claims-beah-patient-privacy-not-preempted-hipaa-connecticut-supreme-
cou [https//perma.cc/95S5-EGYR].
141 Byrne, 102 A.3d at 32.
1421d at 36. The OBGYN also notified her "that it would not disclose [her] health
information without her authorization." Id,
143 Id; Grande, supra note 140.
144Byrne, 102 A.3d at 36.
145 Id
146 1d. at 36-37 (footnote omitted) (listing other claims, including breach of contract,
negligent misrepresentation, and negligent infliction of emotional distress).14 7 1d at 37.
148 See id at 38.
1 49 1d at 41.
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The Connecticut Supreme Court first agreed that HIPAA's statutory
structure precludes a private cause of action for medical privacy violations.150
However, it also noted that federal laws normally do not preempt state causes
of action purely because they impose higher liabilities. 151 The court then
concluded that HIPAA's regulatory history demonstrated it was not meant to
"preempt tort actions under state law arising out of the unauthorized release of
a plaintiff s medical records."1 52 Lastly, based largely on precedents from other
states, the court found that HIPAA could inform the standard of care for
negligence claims "arising from allegations of negligence in the disclosure of
patients' medical records pursuant to subpoena."1 53 However, the court did not
decide if Connecticut actually recognized "claims arising from a health care
provider's alleged breach of its duty of confidentiality in the course of
complying with a subpoena," so actual negligence would depend on the lower
court's finding on remand. 154
This finding has been hailed as "precedent-setting" 5 5 and "a reminder to
[covered entities] . . . that failing to comply with HIPAA [can] result not only
in government enforcement but also claims of negligence brought by
individuals." 5 6 While this is an achievement for plaintiffS,1 57 this holding
arguably has many unaddressed problems.
i. Preemption Problems
The preemption problem here is twofold. First, rather than applying the
case-by-case and law-by-law preemption analysis envisioned by HIPAA, 158 the
court made a sweeping pronouncement without regard to settled law around
HIPAA's applicability and preemption.1 59 While it concluded that HIPAA-
influenced torts were not preempted, that conclusion rests on an illusory basis
150 Byrne, 102 A.3d at 43-45.
151Id at 45.
152 Id at 46.
153 Id at 49.
I 5 4 See id
155 Albeit in a statement from Emily's attorney. Grande, supra note 140.
1 56 Douglas Dahl, What Preemption? Connecticut State Court Gives Life to Negligence




1 57 See Rutherford, supra note 34, at 211.
1 58 See Preemption of State Law, supra note 90 ("Since preemption is a judicially
developed doctrine, it is reasonable to interpret this term as indicating that the statutory
analysis should tie in to the analytical formulations employed by the courts. Also, [these]
court-developed tests .. . represent a long-term, thoughtful consideration of the problem of
defining when a state/federal conflict exists. They will also, we assume, generally be
employed by the courts when conflict issues arise . . .
1 59 See Byrne, 102 A.3d at 49.
432 [Vol. 79:2
THE HIPAA-POTA-MESS
since the court did not analyze if the tort was actually recognized in
Connecticut. 160 In other words, the court did a preemption analysis on a state
tort that did not actually exist. 16 1
The second, and larger, problem is that HIPAA-influenced torts are
essentially attempts to dress up HIPAA claims and avoid the fact that HIPAA
does not create a private right of action. 16 2 Only Congress can create a "private
right[] of action to enforce federal law," and when these issues come up, courts
should "interpret the statute Congress has passed to determine whether it
displays an intent to create not just a private right but also a private remedy."l 63
Unless both exist, then courts cannot create a private right of action, even if such
an option would be desirable as a policy matter or "compatible with the
statute."16
Courts addressing HIPAA issues have consistently found no private right of
action and that Congress showed no intent to create a private right or remedy. 165
Instead, Congress required that the "Secretary" comply with the statute,1 6 6 that
"[t]he Secretary . . . establish specifications for implementing each of the
standards adopted under this part," 167 and that the Secretary impose fines and
punishments for violations of the Act. 168 Even when promulgating regulations,
the HHS noted that it did not "have the legislative authority to grant a private
right of action to sue under this statute" for privacy breaches, and "[o]nly
Congress [could] grant that right."1 69 Thus, there is no way to infer a private
cause of action from HIPAA itself.
1 6 0 See id at 49.
161 See Byrne v. Avery Ctr. for Obstetrics & Gynecology, P.C., No.
FBTCV076001633S, 2015 WL 5236816, at *5-7 (Conn. Super. Ct. Aug. 3, 2015) (refusing
to recognize a "common-law duty of confidentiality," despite the Connecticut Supreme
Court's assumption that the common law recognized such an action).
162 See Brief of the Defendant-Appellee at 10-14, Byrne, 102 A.3d 32 (No. 18904). As
an Ohio court recently noted when declining to recognize a HIPAA-influenced tort, "to the
extent that HIPAA universally has been held not to authorize a private right to action, to
permit HIPAA regulations to define per se the duty and liability for breach is no less than a
private action to enforce HIPAA." Sheldon v. Kettering Health Network, 40 N.E.3d 661, 674
(Ohio Ct. App. 2015); see also Skinner v. Tel-Drug, Inc., No. CV-16-00236-TUC-JGZ
(BGM), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12427, at *8-10 (D. Ariz. Jan. 27, 2017) (rejecting a
negligence per se claim based on HIPAA establishing the duty of care, in part because
HIPAA lacks a private right of action and enforcing it via negligence per se is the same as
enforcing it via private action).
163 Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286 (2001).
1 1d. at 286-87. In Sandoval, the Court refused to create a private right of action "to
enforce disparate-impact regulations promulgated under Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of
1964." Id at 278, 293.
165 See supra note 62 and accompanying text; infra notes 220-25 and accompanying
text.
166 See 42 U.S.C. § 1320d-1(f) (2012).
167 1d § 1320d-1(d).
1 68 Id § 1320d-5(a)(1).
169 Standards for Privacy, supra note 46, at 82,566.
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Furthermore, HIPAA does not preempt state laws relating "to the privacy
of individually identifiable health information" that are "more stringent" than
the Privacy Rule. 170 However, courts using HIPAA-influenced negligence
claims seemingly fail to recognize that the federal statute defines a state law that
"[r]elates to the privacy of individually identifiable health information" as one
that either has the "specific purpose of protecting the privacy of health
information" or that "affects the privacy of health information in a direct, clear,
and substantial way."171 These state torts may be more stringent than HIPAA,
but it is not clear that they actually affect the privacy of health information
directly, clearly, or substantially, and they certainly lack the specific purpose of
protecting the privacy of health information. 172 They only affect medical
privacy clearly once the HIPAA standards are applied.1 73 This leads to serious
questions about whether or not these claims are actually preempted, which is
another avenue toward the problem of varied interpretations between states and
unclear doctrine.
ii. Other Problems with HIPAA-Influenced Torts
Outside of the preemption issues with HIPAA-influenced torts, other
problems exist as well. First, many of these torts focus on the confidential
relationship between doctor and patient.1 74 While this is sometimes
beneficial,1 75 it ignores situations where the person wrongfully disclosing the
information is not a health care worker. As HHS notes on its website, "[m]any
organizations that have health information about [individuals] do not have to
follow" HIPAA's regulations.1 76 Such organizations include life insurers,
"[m]any state agencies like child protective service agencies," and "[m]ost
schools." 77 These entities also lack the confidential patientdoctor relationship
in HIPAA-influenced tort cases.1 78
17045 C.F.R. § 160.202 (2016).
1 7 1Id. § 160.203(b).
1 72 See Biddle v. Warren Gen. Hosp., 715 N.E.2d 518, 523 (Ohio 1999) (noting that
traditional tort theories such as "invasion of privacy, defamation, implied breach of
contract, . . . negligence, and medical malpractice" are "ill-suited" for medical privacy
claims because they are designed to protect other interests and "only coincidentally overlap
that of preserving patient confidentiality").
173 See, e.g., Byrne v. Avery Ctr. for Obstetrics & Gynecology, P.C., 102 A.3d 32, 35
(Conn. 2014).
174 See Collins, supra note 33, at 227. For example, the HIPAA-influenced tort in Byrne
grew from "a health care provider's breach of its duty of confidentiality." Byrne, 102 A.3d
at 36.
17 5 See Collins, supra note 33, at 227-28 (noting these claims do not rely on intent,
offensiveness, or publicity).
17 6 HS, Your Rights Under HIPAA, supra note 54.
17 7 Id.
17 8 While these are problems in HIPAA-based tort cases, they would also be applicable
in non-HIPAA-based tort cases based on negligence or breach of confidentiality.
434 [Vol. 79:2
THE HIPAA-POTA-MESS
Second, there remains the serious possibility of creating disparities within
HIPAA itself by having various state interpretations of federal rules rather than
leaving it up to the federal agency. As state courts determine how much HIPAA
has influenced their standard of care, or what it means to be "more stringent"
than the federal rule, they are creating varying interpretations that are bound to
differ between the states.179 Thus, although these torts help plaintiffs recover,
they create ambiguity and destroy uniformity among the states. They also create
a questionable preemption analysis that will likely cause more litigation as
courts have to figure out how to apply a complex federal law.
V. FIXING THE MESS: How NoN-HIPAA-INFLUENCED TORTS AND
SUPREME COURT GUIDANCE CAN HELP SOLVE THESE PROBLEMS
In light of the previous principles and various, confusing solutions, this Note
first suggests that courts should adopt a non-HIPAA-based tort approach,
similar to that taken in Ohio. While this is by no means the majority approach
so far, it avoids more potential preemption problems and allows more state-
based control in this important area of litigation. Furthermore, this approach
allows for victim compensation, unlike HIPAA itself. One of HIPAA's largest
problems is its lack of victim compensation, which could serve to deter future
violations and to make victims whole again.180 While Congress and HHS
obviously recognized that "[p]rivacy is a fundamental right," victims have fallen
by the wayside. 181
Second, regardless of which approach the states choose, this Note asserts
that the U.S. Supreme Court needs to take a preemption case and rule on this
issue because the now heavily varied state standards create a patchwork of
confusing legal rules, and individuals' important privacy rights should not vary
based on which state they live in. 182 While this Note advocates for the Court to
find that HIPAA-based torts are preempted because they are essentially dressed-
up HIPAA claims contrary to the regulatory scheme and are not more stringent
than current protections, any clarification of HIPAA preemption issues would
be generally welcomed.
179 See infra notes 241-45 and accompanying text.
180 HIPAA's enforcement focus is on "education, technical assistance, and voluntary
compliance[,] and not on finding violations and imposing penalties." Standards for Privacy,
supra note 46, at 82,604.
181 See id at 82,464. While much of the public and governmental attention focuses on
security breaches for larger groups of people, "it's often little-noticed smaller-scale
violations of medical privacy-the ones that affect only one or two people-that inflict the
most harm." Omstein, Small-Scale Violations, supra note 36.
I82 See, e.g., In re Cmty. Health Sys., Inc., No. 15-CV-222-KOB, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
123030, at *87-94 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 12, 2016) (dismissing some, but not all, HIPAA-based
negligence per se claims against defendants based on differing state laws surrounding
"whether a plaintiff may pursue a negligence per se claim based on an alleged violation of a
federal statute that does not provide a private right of action").
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A. Ohio's Medical Privacy Tort: An (Imperfect) Independent Tort
Model
In contrast to the HIPAA-influenced torts, Ohio uses an independent, non-
HIPAA-based tort approach. 183 The evolution of Ohio's "independent
tort ... for the unauthorized, unprivileged disclosure to a third party of
nonpublic medical information that a physician or hospital has learned within a
physician-patient relationship" has evolved over time. 1 As early as 1965, Ohio
recognized a tort for "[t]he unauthorized revelation of medical secrets, or any
confidential communication given in the course of treatment."185 This was
premised on the idea of an implied contract in the doctor-patient relationship
"that any confidential information gained through the relationship will not be
released without the patient's permission."l 86
In 1999 (prior to the Privacy Rule), the Ohio Supreme Court affirmed this
tort's existence, but clarified it as "an independent common-law tort of breach
of confidence in the physician-patient setting." 87 This was not an absolute
privilege, and it did allow for medical providers to disclose when required by
statutory or "common-law duty, or where disclosure [was] necessary to protect
or further a countervailing interest which outweigh[ed] the patient's interest in
confidentiality." 8 8 As for the "authorization" requirement, consents "to release
medical information [had to] be fairly specific in terms of to whom the release
[was] made."1 89
In a post-HIPAA world, Ohio courts began reexamining this tort more
closely and have struggled with where exactly HIPAA fits in.1 90 In 2012, Ohio's
Tenth Appellate District addressed whether this tort still existed in OhioHealth
Corp. v. Ryan.19 1 There, the court granted dismissal for OhioHealth Corporation
for allegedly creating "false identifiable health information" about the appellant
and disclosing it to a third party for payment purposes.1 92
The court held that "[e]ven if we assume that Biddle allows a claim for an
independent tort against a health care provider for the unauthorized,
unprivileged disclosure to a third party of nonpublic medical information
learned via a physician-patient relationship," when the information involves
183 This Note endorses a non-HIPAA-based tort approach, though not exactly in the
same way as it has been construed in Ohio. See infra Part V.B.184 Biddle v. Warren Gen. Hosp., 715 N.E.2d 518, 523 (Ohio 1999).
1 8 5 Hammonds v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 243 F. Supp. 793, 802 (N.D. Ohio 1965).
186Id at 801.
18 7 Biddle, 715 N.E.2d at 522.
188Id. at 524 (e.g., public safety concerns).
1 89 Id. at 527.
190 See, e.g., OhioHealth Corp. v. Ryan, No. 1OAP-937, 2012 WL 68733, at *3-5 (Ohio
Ct. App. Jan. 10, 2012).
191 See id
1 9 2 Id at *1.
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account information, the claim would fail.193 This was because the release of
information for payment was authorized under HIPAA (meaning it was not
unauthorized), and because the tort was preempted by HIPAA. 194 Thus, the
court said that HIPAA both informed the tort's authorization requirement and
preempted the tort. This was a confusing standard that could presumably be
solved by finding "authorization" is independent from HIPAA, which is what
Ohio's Second Appellate District did in 2015 in Sheldon v. Kettering Health
Network.19 5
In Sheldon, the court tried to answer "whether Biddle['s] common-law right
of action recognized in 1999 survive[d] HIPAA." 196 The plaintiffs asserted that
the defendant's medical information storage system normally prevented
unauthorized access per HIPAA requirements, but an administrator, Sheldon,
had unauthorized access to the plaintiffs' medical records. 197 He "improperly
accessed extremely sensitive medical information" about his ex-wife and shared
it. 198 There were also other "significant" breach incidents, which could have
been prevented if the health network had reasonably run reports and monitored
the system.19 The plaintiffs sued for "common-law tort claims for invasion of
privacy, negligence, negligence per se, negligent training, negligent
supervision, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and breach of fiduciary
duty."200
First, the court noted that the individual torts against Sheldon did not
"necessarily appear to depend on an alleged HIPAA violation," and that the
common-law claims against him for "improperly accessing and sharing the
plaintiffs' health information" could be brought regardless of HIPAA. 20 1
However, the court refused to hold Kettering Health Network vicariously liable
for this behavior, as it was outside the scope of his employment.202
Next, the court concluded that HIPAA did not preempt the Biddle torts
against the hospital for "invasion of privacy, negligence, negligence per se,
negligent training, negligent supervision, intentional infliction of emotional
193 Id at *4.
194Id
195 See Sheldon v. Kettering Health Network, 40 N.E.3d 661, 671 (Ohio Ct. App. 2015).
196 Id.197 1d at 665-67.
198Id at 666.
199 Id
200Id at 664. An important issue on appeal was whether the health network was
vicariously liable for Sheldon's actions. Id at 667. However, the plaintiff also asserted that
governmental HIPAA enforcement did not "preclude[] a private individual from bringing a
tort action" and that "[c]ommon sense and public policy ... support[] that common law
causes of action should be permitted even where they overlap with HIPAA violations."
Plaintiff-Appellant's Brief at 9, Sheldon, 40 N.E.3d 661 (No. 26432).
201 Sheldon, 40 N.E.3d at 667.
2021d. at 668-69.
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distress, and breach of fiduciary duty." 203 The court found no evidence that the
tort actually conflicted with HIPAA because the claim did not assert "recovery
for release of information that HIPAA specifically allows." 204 Allowing
individual damage recovery did not interfere with federal enforcement, meaning
providers could comply with both rules, and allowing such damages could
enhance patient protections. 205 The "independent tort recognized in Biddle
[was] still viable after HIPAA[,] although the parameters of such a claim may
have been impacted by HIPAA preemption." 206 The court noted the
"conundrum" about the "unauthorized" requirement, finding that disputes about
valid authorizations would likely lead to HIPAA references. 207 Using HIPAA
to determine authorization might allow for HIPAA enforcement via state tort,
"which is arguably contrary to the overwhelming conclusion that HIPAA does
not provide a private right of action." 208 Because "authorization" was not the
question in this case, the court did not resolve the problem. 209
However, the court refused to accept HIPAA as the standard of care for
negligence claims or the basis for negligence per se, as this would be
"tantamount to authorizing a prohibited private right of action for violation of
HIPAA itself." 210 Regarding the "HIPAA-based" claim for breach of
confidentiality, the court did not address HIPAA's impact on the tort, but rather
concluded that there was not sufficient disclosure for the Biddle tort to apply.211
While the Ohio court did not answer the question of how HIPAA impacts
"authorization" in its tort, it did recognize that the tort can exist independently
of HIPAA. Thus, it avoids the preemption problem of the HIPAA-based torts,
which essentially create a disguised private right of action. Furthermore,
allowing heightened recovery does not interfere with federal enforcement
20 3 Id at 670-72. The plaintiffs claimed their suit was not based on HIPAA, but the court
believed the complaint was "grounded in the notion that KHN's actions were wrongful
because they failed to take steps[] consistent with HIPAA." Id at 670. Nevertheless, the
court interpreted "the complaint broadly to determine whether the allegations assert[ed]
common-law tort claims independent from HIPAA." Id
204Id at 672.20 5 1d Thus, the tort still exists in Ohio. Id However, the court did not clarify whether
this tort is limited to intentional disclosures. See id at 672-73. The court could not find
sufficient evidence that the health network "actively or intentionally disclosed anything." Id
at 673. The Biddle tort "itself dealt with deliberate intentional disclosure," which would
survive a motion to dismiss either "pre- or post-HIPAA, with or without reference to HIPAA
regulations." Id
206 Id at 673.
207 Sheldon, 40 N.E.3d at 673.
208 Id.
209 Id
210Id at 672,674 ("[T]o permit HIPAA regulations to define per se the duty and liability
for breach is no less than a private action to enforce HIPAA, which is precluded."). The court
also rejected HIPAA as a standard based on Ohio precedent that a violation of administrative
rules is not grounds for negligence per se, and because HIPAA does not actually create




efforts, which as stated previously are lax anyway, 2 12 but can actually enhance
the protection of individually identifiable health information.
B. An Independent Tort Is the Best Approach
An independent, non-HIPAA-based tort approach avoids many of the
problems with HIPAA-based approaches. 2 13 This is not to say that the other
approaches are necessarily preempted by HIPAA, but rather that this approach
creates fewer potential problems, and on its face appears to be more closely
aligned to HIPAA's goals, purposes, and language. 2 14
It is undisputed that HIPAA does not create a private right of action,2 15
meaning one cannot sue an individual, hospital, doctor, or other entity when
their HIPAA rights are violated. In fact, HHS commentary for the Privacy Rule
notes that HHS does "not have the authority to provide a right of action by
regulation." 2 16 However, allowing for HIPAA-based torts, in effect, creates a
semiprivate right of action under HIPAA, going against HIPAA's enforcement
scheme. 2 17 Furthermore, because these claims have a higher likelihood of
succeeding than actual HIPAA claims, 2 18 it is foreseeable that plaintiffs will be
2 12 See supra Part III.B.2 13 For a discussion of HIPAA-based torts and their problems, see supra Part IV.B.2.
214 Because all state torts require slightly different elements, it is almost impossible to
say which are actually preempted. However, this Note advocates for the path with the fewest
preemption problems.
2 15 Dodd v. Jones, 623 F.3d 563, 569 (8th Cir. 2010); Acara v. Banks, 470 F.3d 569,
571-72 (5th Cir. 2006) (per curiam); Runkle v. Gonzales, 391 F. Supp. 2d 210, 237 (D.D.C.
2005); Swift v. Lake Park High Sch. Dist. 108, No.03 C 5003,2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 18684,
at *9 (N.D. 111. Oct. 21, 2003) ("No federal court reviewing the matter has ever found that
Congress intended HIPAA to create a private right of action."); Agee v. United States, 72
Fed. Cl. 284, 289-90 (Fed. Cl. 2006); Byrne v. Avery Ctr. for Obstetrics & Gynecology,
P.C., 102 A.3d 32, 45 (Conn. 2014); Sheldon, 40 N.E.3d at 670.
2 16 Standards for Privacy, supra note 46, at 82,605. This is not to say that HHS does not
believe there should be a private right under HIPAA. In fact, in testimony before the Senate
Committee on Labor and Human Resources regarding HIPAA, HHS Secretary Shalala in
1998 said that in order to "give redress to the victims[,] . . . individual[s] whose rights under
the federal privacy law have been violated ... should be permitted to bring a legal action for
actual damages and equitable relief." Donna E. Shalala, Testimony of Secretary of Health
and Human Services, September 11, 1997, U.S. DEP'T HEALTH & HUM. SERVS. (Feb. 1,
1998), https://aspe.hhs.gov/testimony-secretary-health-and-human-services-september-11-
1997 [https://perma.cc/4MTK-QDEB].
2 17 See Sheldon, 40 N.E.3d at 673 (explaining the semi-private right of action under
Biddle); see also Poore-Rando v. United States, No. C 16-5094 BHS, 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
145085, at *14 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 7, 2017) ("[The] vague reliance on the HIPAA 'privacy
rule' . . . cannot be used to establish a per se intrusion or reasonable expectation of
privacy ... [because] 'to permit HIIPAA regulations to define per se the duty and liability for
breach is no less than a private action to enforce HIPAA, which is precluded."' (quoting
Skinner v. Tel-Drug, Inc., No. CV-16-00236-TUC-JGZ (BGM), 2017 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
12427, at *9 (D. Ariz. Jan. 27, 2017))); supra notes 62, 166-73 and accompanying text.2 18 See supra Part 1II.B (regarding lack of enforcement).
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more likely to bring them than actual HIPAA claims. Congress and HHS created
a complex scheme meant to deter violations, educate providers, and protect
individuals, 2 19 but this will be undermined if medical privacy victims largely
choose HIPAA-influenced state torts over HIPAA itself.
Creating such a private right of action is not a practical idea and is not what
Congress intended. 220 In Acara v. Banks, the Fifth Circuit noted that since
HIPAA lacked an express private right, it had to "determine if such [a right was]
implied within the statute." 22 1 HIPAA lacked "express language conferring
privacy rights upon a specific class of individuals," but instead focused on
regulating those who access private medical information and conduct
"electronic health care transactions." 222 It also provided for "both civil and
criminal penalties," with enforcement limited to the HHS Secretary.223 This
delegation of enforcement power was a "strong indication that Congress
intended to preclude private enforcement." 224 After noting that every district
court nationwide that had addressed the issue had also found "Congress did not
intend for private" HIPAA enforcement, the circuit court found that HIPAA
lacked a private cause of action.225
There is also "uncertainty as to whether judges and juries are best equipped
to determine if a violation has even occurred." 226 HIPAA's Privacy Rule is a
complex regulation, and while some of its provisions are straightforward, many
are not.227 For example, while HIPAA's regulations lay out the definition for
"more stringent" laws in 45 C.F.R. § 160.202, courts have been inconsistent in
applying this definition. 22 8 In West Virginia Department of Health & Human
Resources v. E.H, the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals simply stated
that since the state's Department of Health and Human Resources determined
its own regulations were more stringent than the federal requirements, they were
not preempted by HIPAA.229 As the dissent in that case points out, "This total
lack of analysis makes no sense.... Surely Congress did not mean for HIPAA
and the Supremacy Clause to be defeated in such a self-serving manner." 23 0
This problem is also evident in the current leading case using HIPAA as the
standard of care. In Byrne, the Connecticut Supreme Court held that "to the
2 19 See supra Parts II.B, II.C.22 0 See Standards for Privacy, supra note 46, at 82,566 (stating that only Congress has




225 Id at 571-72. No other circuit courts besides the Fifth Circuit have considered the
issue of whether Congress intended to create a private right of action for HIPAA. Id at 571.226 Brill, supra note 62, at 2131.
2 2 7 See id
2 28 See W. Va. Dep't of Health & Human Res. v. E.H., 778 S.E.2d 728, 744 (W. Va.
2015) (Davis, J., dissenting).
2291d at 739-40 (majority opinion).
230Id at 744 (Davis, J., dissenting); see also Standards 2002, supra note 47, at 53,266.
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extent [HIPAA] has become the common practice for Connecticut health care
providers to follow ... in rendering services to their patients, [it] may be utilized
to inform the standard of care" for negligence claims regarding "disclosure of
patients' medical records pursuant to a subpoena." 23 1 Because HIPAA is a
highly technical regulation, it may be difficult for courts to determine to what
extent it has informed the standard of care and what the violation specifically is.
In Byrne, the plaintiff's negligence claim was that the covered entity "acted
negligently by failing to use proper and reasonable care in protecting her
medical file, including disclosing it without authorization in violation of' state
law claims and HIPAA. 232 This necessarily required the statejudge to determine
whether or not there was a HIPAA violation, rather than the federal agency who
designed the regulations.
While it is not impossible forjudges to determine when a HIPAA violation
has occurred, it seems contrary to HIPAA's purpose to allow this type of
variation among the states. In the purposes section of the Privacy Rule's initial
promulgation, HHS stressed the importance of the "[n]eed for a [n]ational
[h]ealth [p]rivacy [fjramework" because "[p]rivacy is a fundamental right." 233
With individual judges and individual states determining what constitute
HIPAA violations rather than HHS, this national framework is undermined.
Also, it is logical to conclude that HHS did not intend for HIPAA to create
the standard of care in state actions. In the implementation regulations, HHS
noted it did not "intend this regulation to describe a set of . . . 'best practices,"'
but rather "a set of basic consumer protections and a series of regulatory
permissions for use and disclosure of health information." 234 While the
regulations are the "mandatory floor," HHS expected "covered entities to rely
on their professional ethics and use their own best judgments in deciding which
of these permissions they [would] use." 235 In describing the enforcement
section, HHS also noted that "civil monetary penalties and ... referrals for
criminal prosecution," were only to be used when "voluntary compliance [could
not] be achieved." 236 This cuts against allowing damages recovery for violations
as determined by state courts, which may not take into account HHS's goal of
achieving HIPAA compliance without the immediate use of penalties.2 37
231 Byrne v. Avery Ctr. for Obstetrics & Gynecology, P.C., 102 A.3d 32, 49 (Conn.
2014).232 1d. at 36.




237 Allowing HIPAA to be the standard of care is the same as enforcing HIPAA through
a private right of action. It allows individuals to sue for HIPAA violations against the clear
intent of the statute. See supra notes 62, 166-69 and accompanying text. The approach
advocated in this Note avoids this dilemma by separating HIPAA from the private cause of
action. This way, one cannot sue for HIPAA violations specifically, but can still receive




C. Ohio's Independent Tort Approach Provides a Base Modelfor Other
Independent Tort Approaches
The independent tort approach taken by Ohio seems to best avoid these
problems. 238 Unlike HIPAA-based torts, an independent tort avoids facial
preemption problems. Rather than creating a semiprivate right of action by
allowing recovery when IPAA has been violated, an independent tort can exist
without reference to HIPAA standards. 239 Thus, judges and juries applying and
analyzing this tort can refrain from analyzing complex, individual HIPAA
requirements.24 0 Instead, states can develop their own judicially crafted plans to
protect their own citizens.
This approach also avoids the concerns about HIPAA variations among
states resulting from HIPAA-influenced torts.24 1 Rather than each state court
system ruling on what constitutes HIPAA violations, with independent torts the
states can continue their common-law protections that existed prior to HIPAA
and develop their own independent systems that can be more stringent than
HIPAA's requirements. 242 This avoids disrupting the national framework
constituting what the federal government considers to be HIPAA violations.
However, the Ohio approach is not perfect. As noted above, there is a
serious question regarding exactly what "unauthorized" 243 means in the Ohio
Biddle tort.2 M While Ohio has not definitively ruled on whether HIPAA matters
for purposes of authorization, a potential solution here is for the tort to go above
and beyond HIPAA authorization in order to avoid preemption problems.245 If,
with regard to use or disclosure, the word "unauthorized" allows the state to
"restrictH a use or disclosure" 2 46 that would be permitted under HIPAA, or, with
238 Although, as noted in Part V.B, this approach is currently not entirely consistent
statewide and the courts have not fully set out the new parameters of the independent tort in
a post-HIPAA world.
23 9 See Sheldon v. Kettering Health Network, 40 N.E.3d 661, 672 (Ohio Ct. App. 2015).
240 Even under this approach, however, there may be at least a cursory analysis of
HIPAA. For instance, the independent tort claim in Sheldon was "not preempted because
[the court] fail[ed] to see how such a claim [would] conflict[] with HIPAA unless the alleged
claim assert[ed] recovery for release of information that HIPAA specifically allows." Id.
241 There will still be variations among states in exactly how they formulate their tort
approaches (precise method of recovery), but this will prevent inconsistent interpretations of
HIPAA, a federal statute, which influences an individual's capacity to recover.
242 Ohio courts have not analyzed if the independent tort is more stringent than HIPAA
or not. The reasoning behind this is unclear, but one possible reason is that the tort requires
an "active[ or intentional[l" element meaning. Sheldon, 40 N.E.3d at 673 ("Under any set
of circumstances, pre- or post-HIPAA, with or without reference to HIPAA regulations, the
intentional, unauthorized disclosures in Biddle should be actionable. Accordingly, we
conclude that the independent tort recognized in Biddle is still viable after HIPAA although
the parameters of such a claim may have been impacted by HIPAA preemption.").
243 Does it mean unauthorized by HIPAA or by the person receiving medical care?24 4 See supra notes 205-09 and accompanying text.




regard to "the privacy of individually identifiable health information," 24 7 allows
the state to set standards that are "more stringent" than the HIPAA standards,
then this would likely avoid preemption problems. The Ohio Supreme Court did
not accept an appeal in Sheldon v. Kettering Health Network,24 8 so the question
of what it means to be "unauthorized" still remains.
D. Improving the Independent Tort Approach: Moving Away from
Preemption and Practical Problems
There are many ways courts could improve upon Ohio's independent tort
approach, both to safeguard against preemption problems and to avoid practical
problems. First, to ensure that the tort's requirements are actually more stringent
than HIPAA's Privacy Rule, courts could attach a high level of damages,
including punitive damages, for violations. In implementing the Privacy Rule,
HHS noted that HIPAA's penalties ("fines and imprisonment") "could be
imposed in addition to the same type of penalty imposed by a state law." 249 HHS
also stated that state laws allowing for individual recovery would not actually
conflict with HIPAA's penalties.2 50 In addition to there being no conflict,
adding harsher penalties for medical privacy violations might make independent
torts more stringent than current protections, which do not personally
compensate victims. In response to a question about punitive damages, as well
as other types of additional damages, HHS said it lacked the authority to
promulgate such a damages rule, but that it believed "federal law should allow
any individual whose rights have been violated to bring an action for actual
damages and equitable relief." 25 1 It did not specifically reject the idea of
punitive damages, so this would not necessarily be contrary to HIPAA.
As HHS notes on its website, state laws are "'more stringent' than the
HIPAA Privacy Rule if [they] relate[] to the privacy of individually identifiable
health information and provide[] greater privacy protections for individuals'
identifiable health information." 2 52 In updating the independent tort approach
for the modern era, state courts could expand the category of individuals that
can be liable for medical privacy violations, which would seemingly provide
greater privacy protections. Texas takes this approach through their statutory
scheme,2 53 and courts could adapt this to the common law by allowing more
247 See id § 160.203(b).
248 Sheldon v. Kettering Health Network, 45 N.E.3d 244 (Ohio 2015) (mem.).
249 Standards for Privacy, supra note 46, at 82,582.
2501d.
251 Id. at 82,605.
252 See HH S, More Stringent, supra note 88.253 See Hall & Nickel, supra note 99. Courts could also adopt some of the other Texas
statutory provisions within their common law torts as well. For example, Texas provides for
increased civil penalties "in addition to any penalties for violating federal laws." Id It also
requires covered entities to "provide patients with electronic copies of their electronic health
records within 15 business days of the patient's written request," whereas HIPAA has a
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entities to face liability for improper disclosures. In general, Ohio has not yet
adopted a more expansive category of those potentially liable for unauthorized
disclosures, limiting it instead to "a physician or hospital that commits an
unauthorized and unprivileged disclosure and a third-party that induces the
disclosure to be made."2 54
Another way to ensure independent torts are truly more stringent than the
Privacy Rule's requirements is to expand the definition of "unauthorized
disclosure." As mentioned previously, Ohio courts have been unclear about
what "unauthorized" means in Ohio's independent tort, especially with regard
to HIPAA regulations themselves. 25 5 At least one Ohio appellate court decision
seems to cast doubt on whether the tort, as applied, is truly more stringent than
HIPAA's requirements. In Scott v. Ohio Department of Rehabilitation &
Correction, Ohio's Tenth District held that allowing "supervised [prison]
inmate[s] access to trash containing unshredded medical documents" with other
inmates' IV status was not a "disclosure" under the tort, even when inmates
then distributed that information to the general population, meaning that
"unauthorized" disclosures could include unintentional actions ... just not in
this case.2 56 This appears less stringent than HHS's given enforcement
examples. 25 7 So, by expanding the definition of "unauthorized disclosures" to
thirty-day rule. Id While it may be difficult to craft the specific deadline requirements into
judicial solutions, courts could use them to influence damages (for example, the longer it
takes to receive records equates to higher damages because it looks unreasonable). HHS even
gives the example of state laws "that provide[] individuals with a right to inspect and obtain
a copy of their medical records in a more timely manner than the Privacy Rule [as] 'more
stringent."' HHS, More Stringent, supra note 88. While this seems focused on the more
statutory-based approach, there is no reason it could not extend to the common law.2 54 Templeton v. Fred W. Albrecht Grocery Co., 72 N.E.3d 699, 702 (Ohio Ct. App.
2017) (refusing to apply the independent tort to a plaintiffs employer after another employee
accidently emailed his confidential psychological report to other employees). But see
Hageman v. Sw. Gen. Health Ctr., 893 N.E.2d 153, 154 (Ohio 2008) ("[A]n attorney may be
liable for the unauthorized disclosure to a third party of medical information regarding an
opposing party that was obtained through litigation.").2 55 See supra notes 243-48 and accompanying text.
256 Scott v. Ohio Dep't of Rehab. & Corr., 999 N.E.2d 231, 234, 240 (Ohio Ct. App.
2013). The court also found that the prison's decision not to have a "comprehensive medical
trash disposal policy" was protected by discretionary immunity, meaning the prison could
not be held liable for the tort. Id at 238-39.
257 For example, HHS's website details an enforcement action requiring a doctor's office
to revise its fax cover page in addition to office-wide training on proper faxing procedures
after the office mistakenly faxed a patient's medical records, which contained his HIV status,
to his employer instead of his new provider. See HHS, All Case Examples, supra note 77. In
another example, HHS detailed requiring a medical practice to reposition computer monitors,
add privacy screens, and develop other safeguards after it displayed patient information to
others on easily visible computer screens. See id Leaving medical records in a place
accessible by inmates is at least as improper and irresponsible as sending a mistaken fax and
displaying private patient information on publicly visible screens, making Ohio's approach
appear less stringent than Privacy Rule requirements.
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include acts like leaving medical records in accessible trash, courts could help
ensure the stringency of independent torts.
A practical problem victims of unauthorized disclosure face, especially in
Ohio, is a lack of vicarious liability. While Ohio has not outright rejected
vicarious liability, the Sheldon case is instructive with regard to the uphill battle
victims face. In Sheldon, the court refused to recognize respondeat superior
liability for the employer after the employee improperly accessed and shared the
victim's health information. 258 Under Ohio law, the employee's unauthorized
and improper actions were not done with the purpose of serving his employer,
meaning they were not done within the scope of his employment. 259 Thus, the
tort claims against the employer were dismissed. 260
Indiana has taken the opposite approach, which should be instructive to
courts implementing independent tort approaches. In Walgreen Co. v. Hinchy,
an Indiana appellate court held Walgreen liable after one of its pharmacists (by
the name of Withers) looked up the prescription record of her romantic partner's
former significant other and gave it to her romantic partner. 261 The court stated
that "the fact that a tortfeasor is empowered to commit the tort because of his
employment weighs in favor of respondeat superior" liability before holding
that since "some of Withers's actions were authorized," a jury consideration on
the employer's liability was appropriate.262 The court then affirmed the jury
verdict finding Walgreen liable under respondeat superior for Withers's "tort of
negligence by virtue of professional malpractice of a pharmacist." 263
While the Indiana case was not an independent tort case, as advocated by
this Note, the finding of respondeat superior liability is still instructive. The jury
in Hinchy awarded the victim $1.8 million in damages, with both Walgreen and
Withers jointly responsible for 80 %.264 It is unlikely that Withers as an
individual could pay this entire amount, even though thejury found it reasonable
for such a breach of medical privacy. In independent tort cases where the harm
is essentially the same as in Hinchy, juries could award similar amounts that
employee defendants are also unlikely to satisfy. However, if courts are willing
to impose respondeat superior liability for employees' breaches of medical
258 Sheldon v. Kettering Health Network, 40 N.E.3d 661, 668 (Ohio Ct. App. 2015).
259Id at 669.
260Id at 668.
261 Walgreen Co. v. Hinchy, 21 N.E.3d 99, 104, 109-10 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014). The
pharmacist, Withers, started dating her significant other, Peterson, sometime around 2009.
Id at 104. Peterson's on-again, off-again sexual partner, Hinchy, became pregnant with
Peterson's child in 2009, around the time Peterson also learned he'd contracted genital
herpes. Id Withers looked up Hinchy's prescription profile in Walgreen's computer system
and eventually Peterson exchanged texts with Hinchy claiming to have a printout about her
birth control prescription. Id A loss prevention specialist determined that this resulted in a
HIPAA/privacy violation, and Withers had to take HIPAA retraining in addition to receiving
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privacy and confidentiality, this will better compensate victims and make
independent torts more practicable.
In sum, the Ohio approach avoids the most preemption problems, and will
also allow courts to carefully craft their own solutions that can be more stringent
and more protective than the federal laws. Thus, this Note recommends that
courts strongly consider adopting a modified Ohio approach, namely an
independent tort approach with high levels of damages, an expanded category
of individuals who can be liable for medical privacy violations, an expanded
definition of "unauthorized disclosures," and respondeat superior liability.
Because of preemption concerns, this will help courts ensure that their tort
approaches fall into the "more stringent" category. However, lower courts'
analyses likely need Supreme Court guidance on preemption, so, as discussed
below, it is important for the Supreme Court to accept certiorari on a HIPAA
preemption case.
E. The Supreme Court Should Rule in Favor of Non-HIPAA-Influenced
Torts, or Alternatively Rule in General on the HIPAA Preemption Issue
Regardless of which approach is correct, the United States Supreme
Court2 65 needs to rule on how HIPAA impacts these state solutions, especially
the tort claims. As seen above, different state courts vary in their approaches to
the interaction between state and federal rules regarding medical privacy. This
is specifically the situation HHS intended to remedy by promulgating the
Privacy Rule.26 6 Congress has been seemingly unwilling or unable to amend
HIPAA (and HHS has not created new regulations as such) to clarify whether
or not HIPAA may be used in private actions.26 7 Also, based on the recent state
court cases regarding this issue, it appears states will continue to create their
own, diverging standards. 2 68
265 The Ohio Supreme Court should consider taking such a case as well. Providing
guidance to Ohio courts on their unclear and somewhat conflicting approaches could serve
as a beneficial guidepost in attempting to implement a non-HIIPAA-based tort approach.2 66 See Standards for Privacy, supra note 46, at 82,463 ("Rules requiring the protection
of health privacy in the United States have been enacted primarily by the states. While
virtually every state has enacted one or more laws to safeguard privacy, these laws vary
significantly from state to state and typically apply to only part of the health care system.").
267 At this time, there do not appear to be any proposed bills or regulations clarifying
this issue. Furthermore, with 2017 campaign promises of eliminating two old regulations for
every new regulation, it seems unlikely new regulations about this will be promulgated any
time soon. See Brian Naylor, Vowing To Roll Back Regulations, Trump Faces Uphill Task,
NPR (Nov. 25, 2016), https://www.npr.org/2016/11/25/503127009/vowing-to-roll-back-
regulations-trump-faces-uphill-task (on file with Ohio State Law Journal).
268 Compare Sheldon v. Kettering Health Network, 40 N.E.3d 661, 672 (Ohio Ct. App.
2015) (rejecting the use of HIPAA in negligence per se and as a standard of care in
negligence claims), with Byrne v. Avery Ctr. for Obstetrics & Gynecology, P.C., 102 A.3d
32, 49 (Conn. 2014) (allowing HIPAA to inform the standard of care in negligence claim).
While this Note advocates the tort-based approach, state-developed statutory approaches are
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By ruling on whether or not HIPAA can influence state torts, and if so in
what fashion, the Supreme Court could help fulfill the purposes of HIPAA's
Privacy Rule. These purposes are protecting and enhancing consumer rights,
improving health care quality "by restoring trust in the health care system," and
"improv[ing] the efficiency and effectiveness of health care delivery by creating
a national framework ... that builds on efforts by states, health systems, and
individual organizations and individuals." 2 69 As states continue to diverge from
one another by creating differing standards, trust is lost between state lines, a
national framework is undermined, and patient rights are left in an uncertain
position. 270
The importance of medical privacy is generally unquestioned, 27 1 and the
Supreme Court itself has recognized the importance of protecting personal
health information. 2 72 For example, in Whalen v. Roe, the Court noted there is
a constitutionally protected interest in privacy, which includes "the individual
interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters." 2 73 Medical privacy serves
important interests, including the public interest in ensuring individuals can get
appropriate and honest physical and mental healthcare, which is "a public good
of transcendent importance." 2 74 In a world where extremely private information
like one's genetic profile can be available online, privacy protections are more
important than ever.2 75
likely to survive the HIPAA preemption analysis as well, especially since legislatures are
able to more easily tailor rules so they are more stringent/protective of patients' rights. See,
e.g., Hall & Nickel, supra note 99 (discussing Texas's more stringent medical privacy
standards); State and Federal Health Privacy Laws, ATT'Y GEN. TEx.,
https//www.texasattomcygeneral.gov/cpd/state-and-federal-health-privacy-laws [https//perma.cc/
KU3L-4UGP] ("[T]he Texas Medical Records Privacy Act provides additional protections to
consumers. The Act is broader in scope than HIPAA because it applies not only to health
care providers, health plans and other entities that process health insurance claims but also
to any individual, business, or organization that obtains, stores, or possesses PHI as well as
their agents, employees and contractors if they create, receive, obtain, use or transmit PHI.").
What this Note answers, however, is how states without such statutes (or those with statutes
that still allow for other common law approaches) should judicially approach medical
privacy violations.269 See Standards for Privacy, supra note 46, at 82,463.
270 Uniformity concerns existed even in the year 2000. Opinion, Strong Protection for
Medical Privacy, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 27, 2000),
http://www.nytimes.com/2000/12/27/opinion/strong-protection-for-medical-privacy.html
(on file with Ohio State Law Journal) ("The new rules set a national minimum standard but
do not override stricter state laws limiting disclosure of information about such conditions
as AIDS, cancer and mental illness. That will leave health plans the costly task of meeting
many different standards, potentially driving up premiums that are already soaring.").
271 See supra Part II.A.
272 See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598-99 (1977); see also Standards for Privacy,
supra note 46, at 82,464-65.
273 Whalen, 429 U.S. at 598-99.
274 Jaffee v. Redmond, 518 U.S. 1, 11 (1996).275 See Standards for Privacy, supra note 46, at 82,465.
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Despite ever-changing technology and new threats, there has been no new
national move to clarify standards and improve continuity among states with
regard to HIPAA. So far, many courts have also been generally unwilling to take
such cases.276 In 2013, the United States Supreme Court actually denied
certiorari in a case about HIPAA-influenced torts.27 7 In R.K v. St. Mary's
Medical Center, Inc., Plaintiff R.K was admitted as a psychiatric patient and
"disclosed confidential personal information that he had not previously
disclosed to anyone, including his estranged wife." 2 78 He did not authorize the
hospital to disclose any information about his condition or hospitalization to
anyone, but hospital employees still "improperly accessed his medical records"
containing his psychological information and disclosed this confidential
information to his wife and her divorce attorney.279 R.K. sued the hospital for
many negligence-based claims, as well as "breach of confidentiality, invasion
of privacy, and punitive damages." 280
The hospital claimed these were merely disguised HIPAA claims, which the
lower court agreed with and dismissed "based upon HIPAA preemption." 28 1
The state's Supreme Court of Appeals, however, found that "HIPAA [did] not
preempt state-law causes of action for the wrongful disclosure of health care
information." 2 82 The court also noted, without explicitly holding, that "contrary
to finding state common-law claims preempted by HIPAA, several courts have
found that a HIPAA violation may be used either as the basis for a claim of
negligence per se, or that HIPAA may be used to supply the standard of care for
other tort claims." 283
276 See, e.g., St. Mary's Med. Ctr., Inc., v. R.K., 133 S. Ct. 1738 (2013) (mem.) (denying
certiorari to a lower court decision authorizing HIPAA-based torts); Young v. Carran, No.
2008-SC-000862-D, 2009 Ky. LEXIS 592 (Ky. Aug. 19, 2009) (denying discretionary
review of lower decision, which rejected argument that state statute codifying common law
negligence per se actually created a state cause of action for a HIPAA violation), denying
cert. to Young v. Can-an, 289 S.W.3d 586, 588 (Ky. Ct. App. 2008); Webb v. Roberson, No.
W2012-01230-SC-R11-CV, 2013 Tenn. LEXIS 1085 (Tenn. Dec. 23, 2013) (denying
certiorari to lower court decision finding state law was not preempted by HIPAA). On a
broader note, in 2008 the U.S. Supreme Court was asked to grant certiorari in a case
regarding a HIPAA-influenced standard of care. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 54-55,
Spaeth v. Cherokee Ctr. for Change, Inc., 555 U.S. 883 (2008) (No. 08-56) ("[Urging] this
Honorable Court ... to grant Certiorari in this matter, such that: ... The federal Health
Insurance Portability and Accountability Act ("HIPAA") can be consistently interpreted and
applied across States, ensuring every United States Citizen[] is afforded their Constitutional
rights (U.S. & State) to equal protection of their protected health information."). However,
the petition was denied. Spaeth, 555 U.S. 883 (mem.).2 7 7 St Mary's Med Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1738.2 7 8 R.K. v. St. Mary's Med. Ctr., Inc., 735 S.E.2d 715, 717 (W. Va. 2012).
279 Id2 80 Id. at 718.
281Id. at 718-19.
282Id. at 721.
2 83 Id at 723.
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The medical center petitioned for certiorari on February 13, 2013.284 In the
petition, the medical center claimed that the common-law torts were an
"obstacle to the full purposes and objectives" of HIPAA, and should thus be
preempted. 285 The lower court's decision allowed West Virginia to provide a
remedy for HIPAA violations that Congress never intended, which was contrary
to HIPAA. 2 86 The medical center rejected the notion that this overlap was
acceptable because both HIPAA and the common law complemented one
another and discouraged improper disclosures. 287 Instead, it argued HIPAA was
intended to "create a national framework for the disclosure of personal health
information," which would become unworkable with these common law
torts. 28 8
Thus, in denying this petition for certiorari, the Supreme Court passed on
the opportunity to clarify federal preemption standards, uphold the federal floor
established by HIPAA, and help reestablish uniformity among medical privacy
actions. This does not serve to clarify standards and will likely only work to
increase litigation, which may in turn increase confusion.
If this area of law is to have any type of clarity or national standard, the
Supreme Court needs to accept a case and decide on the preemption issue. If it
decides to allow HIPAA-based torts, this will permit the states to develop their
own expertise on IPAA violations and perhaps increase federal-state
cooperation in analyzing such issues. Rather than giving vague rulings that
dance around HIPAA standards, this will encourage courts to actually address
violations in tandem with federal law.
If, on the other hand, the Court rules against HIPAA-based torts, as this
Note recommends, this will permit states to move away from continuous
analysis of HIPAA standards and focus more on their individual state needs.
This can allow for more specific regulation, and might actually encourage states
to adopt statutory standards rather than relying on the unclear and complex
HIPAA requirements.
Either way, a Supreme Court ruling will allow states to finally start
achieving justice and compensation for victims of medical privacy violations.
As it stands now, individuals' privacy rights vary between the states and are on
284 Petition for Writ of Certiorari, St. Mary's Med Ctr., 133 S. Ct. 1738 (No. 12-1007).
The question presented was "[w]hether Respondent's common-law tort claims, which are
premised upon an alleged wrongful disclosure of personal health care information, are
preempted by the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996." Id at i.2 8 5 
_d at 6-7.
286 Id at 8-9 (implying that these claims were essentially private causes of action under
HIPAA).2 8 7 Id at 9.
288Id at 10. The following example was given: While medical centers normally receive
requests for medical records from law enforcement, their disclosures are based on HIPAA,
which says that covered entities may disclose in such situations. Id However, with the
possibility of common law suits, medical centers could face negligence or privacy torts for




an uncertain path. A person can recover damages in one state, but not another,
for the same type of violation that Congress has previously attempted to prevent.
Through clarification, this variation and uncertainty can hopefully be erased,
and victims can at least be compensated for their real and tangible losses.
VI. CONCLUSION
Medical records are often sensitive, deeply personal, and damaging when
exploited. When their medical information is improperly disclosed, individuals
can face harrowing situations, such as job loss, reputational harm,
embarrassment, and shame. It is no wonder that Congress sought to create
comprehensive medical privacy reform when it passed HIPAA. However, as
HIPAA enforcement has continued on a slow and non-sanction-based path,
victims of medical privacy violations have been left without this supposed
federal shield. In response to this problem, states have undertaken to craft their
own solutions.289 However, these solutions vary across state lines and provide
unequal protections for important rights.
Addressing privacy violations via tort law has been one of the most common
approaches, but there is now a split in how states approach this. Some allow
HIPAA to influence their torts,290 and some believe HIPAA-influenced torts are
merely a disguise for a forbidden cause of action under HIPAA itself.291 While
there are still questions as to exactly how HIPAA preemption works in this
context, especially because these are relatively new developments, the non-
HIPAA-influenced tort approach seems to avoid the most preemption problems
while providing greater patient protections.
For this reason, should the Supreme Court finally accept a HIPAA
preemption case, it should rule in favor of this type of tort. More generally, the
Supreme Court should accept a HIPAA preemption case in the first place to
create uniformity and reestablish what the national framework is. As medical
privacy litigation will likely continue its increase alongside new medical data
technologies, this would help set expectations for providers and patients, and
reaffirm the importance of medical privacy in American law.
289 Some state solutions existed prior to HIPAA, and some are now influenced by
HIPAA. See supra Part IV.B.290 See Byrne v. Avery Ctr. for Obstetrics & Gynecology, P.C., 102 A.3d 32, 49 (Conn.
2014) (allowing HIPAA to inform the standard of care in negligence cases).2 9 1 See Sheldon v. Kettering Health Network, 40 N.E.3d 661 (Ohio Ct. App. 2015)
(cautioning that the Biddle tort should not be construed as a de facto private right of action
under HIPAA).
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